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Abstract: 
 
The subject of this paper is the question of how causally efficacious mental properties can be 
incorporated into a physicalist framework. The problem is introduced by way of Jaegwon Kim’s 
supervenience-argument, where he formulates it as a question of what causal role is left for the mental 
to play given certain assumptions of the causal structure of the physical universe. I present his version 
of physicalism and how mental to physical relations are conceived within this framework. Further, I 
discuss whether his reductionistic approach to mental causation problem leaves mental properties with 
adequate causal powers. 
In the second half of this paper I consider theories that approach the issue from a non-reductionist 
perspective, positing emergent causal forces fundamented on the defining characteristics of complex 
systems. After elaborating on these basic features of such systems I introduce the notion of cognition in 
its minimal sense as a process of relation between a living system and its environment. This notion is 
then traced upwards through the levels of evolutionary complexity, reaching the sphere of human 
agency and cognition. The assumption underlying the theories presented in the second half is that life 
and mind are fundamentally interconnected and that the causal features of human mentality can only be 
adequately understood as the pinnacle of a hierarchy of organizational complexity. The downward 
structuring influences of these cognitive capacities are essential to the process of living and play an 
indispensable causal role in the characterization of living organisms as self-organizing structures of 
processes. The claim is that mental notions such as normativity and intentionality cannot be 
satisfactorily grasped apart from the natural world they emerge out of.  
Lastly, I briefly consider the theories of the emergent causal powers of mind presented in the second 
half in relation to Kim’s perspective on physicalism. Here I also discuss whether physicalism has room 
for higher-order mental capacities as pictured by these non-reductionist theories.  
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Introduction; stating the issue at hand 
 
 
The question concerning how mind and body are related to one another has had a 
central place in philosophical discussion for centuries, and many prominent thinkers 
have constructed their theories around this issue. From Descartes substance-dualism, 
postulating mind and body as two radically distinct entities connected solely by the 
diminutive pineal gland to contemporary reductive identity theories that consider the 
two to be equivalents, few subjects have garnered more interest and sparked more 
discussion in the philosophical realm than the question of how our minds and our 
bodies are connected and interact. The issue can be more broadly stated as how to 
understand the relation between the mental and the physical, and the answers have 
implications for a wide range of phenomena central to our existence. It goes to the 
very core of how we are to understand ourselves as human beings and how, or if, we 
are able to be genuine causal players in the world on account of our rational agency. 
This concerns as well the possibility of morality, freedom of the will and of course the 
underlying subject of identity and selfhood; 
 
First and foremost, the possibility of human agency, and hence our moral practice, evidently requires 
that our mental states have causal effects in the physical world. In voluntary actions our beliefs and 
desires, our intentions and decisions, must somehow cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways, 
thereby causing the objects around us to be rearranged (…) Secondly, the possibility of human 
knowledge presupposes the reality of mental causation: perception, our sole window to the world, 
requires the causation of perceptual experiences and beliefs by objects and events around us.
1
  
 
The above quote presents just a few of the subjects that have the issue of mental 
causation at its core. The question is most commonly expressed as how mental states 
can have effects in a physical world and this formulation reveals the paradigm that the 
current discussion takes place within. Contemporary participants predominantly 
subscribe to the view that the physical has ontological priority over the mental so that 
                                                 
1
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the burden of proof must lay on the causal powers of the mental. The contention is 
that the natures of the mental and the physical are so diverse that is difficult to see 
how they can stand in a casual relation to one another, and if they must be chosen 
between, then the causal powers of the mental must cede to those of the physical.  
The belief that what exists in the world is first and foremost of a physical nature is 
termed physicalism. The different interpretations of this notion will be of central 
importance in this paper, so for now suffice it to say that the interpretation of 
physicalism one adheres to sets the parameters for the discussion on what the relation 
of the mental to the physical consists of. Regardless of which understanding of 
physicalism one adheres to the concept of existence is most often interpreted in causal 
terms, owing to the common sense belief expressed in what is know as Alexander’s 
dictum. This expresses the idea that it would be difficult to grasp something that has 
no effect on anything else in the world, implying that being real and having causal 
powers go hand in hand.
2
 To deprive the mental of causal potency is in effect to 
deprive it of its reality.
3
 In this regard the reality of mental causation is equivalent to 
the reality of the mental itself and therefore making sense of the causal powers the 
mental in a physically acceptable manner is of paramount importance if one wishes to 
argue for its existence. The debate as presented in this paper concerns how much  
causal reality one can justifiably ascribe to the mental without leaving the physical 
realm, and the two opponents here are termed reductionistic and non-reductionistic 
physicalists, or emergentists.  
 
Samuel Alexander was among the most prominent early advocates of the doctrine of 
emergentism, which initially posited itself as a third way between the extremes of 
mechanistic reductionisms and dualist theories of mind. The first of the two believed 
all existents to be ultimately describable in terms of a small number of fundamental 
laws concerning the paring relations of sets of basic particles
4
 whereas the second 
posited vital entelechies or immaterial forces to describe the workings of the mind. 
Alexander and his contemporaries were inspired by the ideas of John Steward Mill 
and G. H. Lewes, who had drawn a distinction between resultant and emergent 
                                                 
2
 Kim (1992) page 133    
3
 Kim (2008) page 442   
4
 McLaughlin (1992) page 75       
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properties, whereas the latter distinguishes itself by being irreducible to the sum of its 
components.
5
 In the theories of the early emergentists this idea was expressed through 
the coming into being of complex systems, where the causal novelty and the related 
nondeducability of the properties of such systems differentiated them from those 
whose behaviour could be unproblematically understood by way of the laws 
governing its parts in isolation. The primary examples of such higher level forces 
offered of such emergent properties were taken from the realm of chemical and the 
biological 
6
 and it was the discovery of lower-level laws explaining the behaviour of 
what they believed to be emergent phenomena in these domains that to a large degree 
caused their downfall. It was argued that apparently non-reducible phenomena were 
the consequence of insufficient knowledge rather than genuine existents. This 
argument attacked a central weakness of early emergentist theories, namely their 
inability of the properties they postulated to hold up against increased scientific 
knowledge. Related to this was their lack of ability to explain the principles 
structuring such emergent phenomena in a scientifically respectable way, rather 
Alexander expected the emergent qualities he posited to be accepted “with natural 
piety”.7  
 
The positivist school that critiqued early emergentism considered the criterion of any 
existent claiming scientific respectability to be the availability of publicly, physically 
testable verification conditions. Out of the positivist school was born the deductive-
nomological paradigm of science, fronted most prominently by Hempel and 
Oppenheim, for whom scientific explanation was a matter of deduction from initial 
conditions and natural laws.
8
 For them any appearance of emergent phenomena was 
merely indicative of the scope of our knowledge at that time, of having not yet 
discovered the appropriate natural law.
9
 In concert with this view of science Ernest 
Nagel formulated the pervasive idea that reduction must first and foremost concern 
the reduction of one theory to another through the formulation of bridge laws that 
provide connections between the vocabularies of the higher-order theory and that of 
                                                 
5
 Stephan (1992) page 27-28 
6
 McLaughlin (1992) page 55       
7
 Kim (2005) page 103  
8
 Walter (2009) page 98  
9
  Stephan (1992) page 38              
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the lower.
10
 Within this paradigm, and inspired by the success of its utilization in 
physics, reductionistic theories flourished. In the domain of mind-body relations most 
notably the identity theory of Smart and Feigl, who postulated mental events as type-
identical with events in the brain, meaning that a certain mental event “had always 
and everywhere the neurophysiological characterization initially assigned to it”.11 
While the argument from multiple realizability, that identical mental events could be 
instantiated differently by systems of different material composition (and so could not 
be tied to certain material structures) brought down such all-encompassing identities, 
Nagel-type reductions suffered under the accusations that they did not explain what 
was really at interest, namely the bridge laws themselves (in addition it was argued 
that it was not genuine reduction because bridge laws demand an expansion of the 
reduction-base). Today reduction is on the defence while emergentism, now 
commonly termed non-reductive materialism, is again in favour.
12
 
13
 Contemporary 
emergentism has abandoned the historical focus present in the early emergentists’ 
notion of “emergent evolutionism” but retained its core ontological and 
methodological doctrines concerning the organization of phenomena into autonomous 
emergent levels and the relationship between basic physics and the special sciences.
14
 
At its basis is the idea that certain properties at so called higher levels can rightly 
claim a genuine causal standing in relations to the goings on at lower, unproblematic-
ally physical levels. Or, as Jaegwon Kim puts it: “emergent properties are only novel 
editions to the ontology of the world if they bring with them genuinely new causal 
powers (this kind of power can only be downwards)”.15 Of those higher-level 
properties what is of issue here are those that have the characteristics of mentality, 
and as I hope to make clear in the following section it is their downward causal 
efficacy related to the physical universe that is the most pressing concern. The 
question of how the mental can exert causal powers in a physical world is termed the 
problem of mental causation, which in reality is a collection of issues. It concerns the 
roles of reasons and beliefs in directing human behaviour, how such roles can be 
understood in neurobiological terms and why such mental notions matter at all. These 
                                                 
10
  McLaughlin (1992) page 83  
11
  Lycan and Prinz (2008) page 6  
12
 Kim (1999) page 4 
13
 The terms will be used interchangingly in this paper, although I am aware that emergentism is 
sometimes taken to include elements that are not compatible with non-reductive physicalism. 
14
 Kim (1999) page 5 
15
 kim (1999) page 25 
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issues are the subject of a wide array of approaches and for the sake of brevity the 
treatment of mental causation shall be restricted here to so as to avoid discussions 
concerning the specific content of mental notions as well as a general analysis of the 
concept of causation. 
 
In this paper I aim to present an approach to the issue of mental causal powers that 
offers a positive account of how the mental can exert causal influence in its own right 
and therefore deserves to be recognized as a genuine existent in the world, rather than 
an unexplainable by-product of the goings on of the strictly physical level. In order to 
achieve this I will first and foremost utilize the explanatory resources of scientifically 
grounded theories rather than leaning on strictly metaphysical treatments of causation 
and its related notions. The rationale behind this is that the metaphysical approach to 
the subject to a great degree is fundamented on the methodologies of science and that 
if we wish to satisfactory grasp these matters then the assumptions underlying our 
metaphysical doctrines should be brought to light.
16
 Appealing to science to 
understand specifically philosophical questions is termed naturalism, described in the 
following;  
 
Another significant mark of philosophical naturalism is a healthy distrust in arm chair philosophy and a 
priori arguments. To avoid misunderstanding, this does not mean that logical arguments are of little 
value. It just means that in the end nature is the instance against which we must test the truth or falsity 
of our theories and the validity of our arguments, not pure rationality, not even purely logical 
thinking.”17 
 
I will start of by introducing the problem of mental causation as it is concieved of by 
Jaegwon Kim, after a brief presentation of the central elements of non-reductive 
physicalism. Thereafter I will consider Kim’s proposal for a solution to the problem in 
light of his understanding of physicalism and state the challenges that such an 
approach is met by. Using this as my point of departure I then introduce an alternative 
approach to higher-order causal powers that considers systems and their component 
                                                 
16
 I am aware that it goes both way, that the methods of science are influenced by our metaphysical 
frameworks as well. 
17
 Walter (2009) page 150-151 
  6 
processes rather than concrete entities and intrinsic relations as the existences of 
interest. This approach lays the fundament for a theory which posits cognition in its 
minimal form as an essential element in the self-maintaing processes common to all 
living beings. The causal power at work here will then be considered in light of its 
utility in biology, and finally the characteristics describing the activity of living 
systems will be expanded to capture the defining features of the human mind, in an 
account of how the human mind emerges from its biological precursors and the 
fundamental characteristics of life. Lastly I discuss the non-reductive theories 
presented in this paper in relation to the assumptions underlying Kim’s reductive view 
of physicalism. 
 
SECTION ONE 
 
1.1 Non-reduction presented 
 
The concept of supervenience is the most popular way of expressing the physicalist 
commitment of the dependence of the mental upon the physical, the degree of 
dependence between the two being specified by the kind of theory it is utilized within. 
Donald Davidson was the first to translate the notion of supervenience from its 
original form as a technical term in ethics
18
 by developing the idea that supervenient 
mental properties are in some substantive sense dependent on or determined by their 
subvenient base, in combination with the claim that they are not reducible to them in 
an eliminative sense
19
. Davidson did not further develop the notion of supervenience 
in his work
20
 but Jaegwon Kim, who is one of the most prominent participants in the 
discussion of the mind-body problem, has been central in exploring the implications 
of supervenient dependence. The purpose of his exploration has been to make clear 
                                                 
18
 Here it was used to describe the idea that although moral properties cannot be defined in terms of 
natural properties, they strongly depend on such properties in the sense that if two people are exactly 
alike in all their natural properties they must be be alike with respect to their moral properties as well. 
(Beckermann (1992) page 95) 
19
 Kim (1989) page 39 
20
 It was introduced as an explanatory tool in his theory of anomalous monism, where he postulated that 
there could not be any laws connecting mental events with physical events and that therefore, given 
that all events that stand in causal relations must instantiate a law, they are physical events. (Kim 
(1998) page 33) 
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the apparently unavoidable inconsistencies of adhering to dependence without 
reduction, (that is, to be a proponent of non-reductive physicalism) summarized in the 
following three ideas
21
: 
 
 The central element of supervenience as a physicalist thesis is that it contains a 
certain degree of dependence on physical properties. It grounds each mental 
phenomenon within the physical domain by providing a set of conditions that are 
at least nomologically sufficient for it and on which its occurrence depends.
22
 
What happens in our mental life is in some way dependent on and determined by, 
what happens with our bodily processes,
23
 so that nothing more than the goings-on 
at the physical level is needed in order to explain why mental properties come to 
be instantiated. This dependence-relation is stated by Kim in the following;  
 
       (...) if any system s instantiates a mental property M at t, there necessarily exists a physical 
property P such that s instantiates P at t, and necessarily anything instantiating P at any time 
instantiates M at that time.
24
 
 
     This synchrony is expressed as property-covariation.  In other words, when two 
systems instantiate the same P, they can not display differing M’s, so that two 
people in the same neurological state must necessarily exhibit the same intentional 
content. Supervenience as such does not say anything about what this relation 
consists in, such elaboration is left up to the individual theories, but it does claim 
that it is necessarily a synchronous relation, meaning that the supervenient event 
and its base-event begin and end simultaneously,
25
 or in other words that they are 
instantiations of properties of the same objects at the same time. It is also 
expresses an asymmetric relation because the dependence goes only one way, 
giving primacy to the physical domain and its laws.
26
  
 The non-reductionistic or emergentist element is contained in the idea that 
although mental properties are dependent on their supervenience-base, they can 
                                                 
21
 Kim (2005) page 33  
22
 Kim (1998) page 40  
23
 Kim (2005) page 14 
24
 Ibid. page 33  
25
 Ibid. page 34  
26
 Kim (1998) page 7 
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not be reductively identified with this physical substrate. The supervenience-
relation itself is neutral on whether the properties that come about as a result of 
appropriate lower-level conditions are genuinely emergent or merely “resultant”27 
and therefore unproblematically reducible
28
, but non-reductive physicalists claim 
that certain supervenient property-instantiations are emergent in the sense that 
they can not be reductively identified with this physical base. A crucial question is 
of course whether such properties really exist or if they are not all of the latter 
kind and therefore can be reduced to their subvenient base. Related is the question 
of what exactly it is that should be reducible to what, and much of the discussion 
pivots on how this is understood. 
 As mentioned at the onset, events are often conceptualized in terms of their causal 
roles, so that any event or property-instantiation that is to claim genuine existence 
must be able to show legitimate causal standing. If mental properties are to be 
non-reducible that means that they must have causal powers that are not derived 
from their physical realizers in any eliminative sense. They must be definable in a 
causally autonomous way, all the while avoiding becoming severed from the 
physical domain and lapsing into dualism. The demands of physicalism are 
commonly expressed through two principles which are the subject of the next 
section, and the restrictions imposed by these bring forth the question which forms 
Kim’s argument against the existence of mental events as entailed by the three 
points above; “Given that every physical event that has a cause has a physical 
cause, how is a mental cause also possible?”29  
 
 
 
1.2 Closure and exclusion: the principles of physicalism. 
 
Kim’s contention is that adhering to what he considers to be the two central principles 
of physicalism means giving up on the type of causal powers that the non-
reductionistic attach to the mental. The first of these principles concerns the 
assumption that the causal chains leading up to the relevant events can and must be 
                                                 
27
 This distinction was introduced by the early emergentists to differentiate between emergent 
properties and those that are deducible from the laws governing their parts. 
28
 Kim (1999) page 21 
29
 Kim (1998) page 38  
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purely physical. He formulates this in several ways, from its strongest version in the 
following;  
 
If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity that will never take you 
outside the physical domain. That is, no causal chain will ever cross the boundary between the physical 
and the non-physical.
30
 
 
to its weaker version; “If a physical event has a cause that occurs at t, it has a physical 
cause that occurs at t.”.31 The principle that constrains the relevant causes within the 
physical domain principle is termed the causal closure of the physical, where closure 
reflects the point that causes of physical events must be contained within a closed 
physical universe.
32
 Kim’s understanding of this principle is intimately tied to his 
belief in the causally and explanatory self-sufficiency of physics; that all physically 
respectable phenomena can be described, at least as a theoretical possibility, by 
physics and so there is no need to go outside this domain in order to find a cause of 
any physical event;
33
 “On the overall shape and makeup of the world in essential 
outlines, we must depend on what physics, our fundamental science, tells us”.34 
Accordingly, the notion of a causally closed physical domain is very closely related to 
a certain conception of the structure of the world and the explanatory powers of 
physics,
35
   where the belief is that; “it’s only when we reach the fundamental level of 
microphysics  that we are likely to get a causally closed domain.”36 Kim expresses his 
notion of causality in what he calls robust or productive terms and by this he means 
the efficient causation involved in energy transfers, momentum and the like that 
microphysics is concerned with.
37
 The reason for his belief that the domain concerned 
with this kind of causation must be closed is based on the laws of conservation of 
                                                 
30
 Kim (1998) page 40 
31
 Kim (2005) page 43  
32
 Neither of the two versions offers an unproblematic way of understanding causal closure. In its 
strongest version the principle begs the question against non-reductive accounts of mental causation 
because it follows from it that there can not be any non-physical events that are causally related to P-
events. The weaker version on the other hand allows for scenarios where a p-event has two non-
sufficient causes, one mental and one physical, that together make up a sufficient cause 
33
 Kim (2005) page 16 
34
 Kim (2005) page 149 
35
  The principle of completability of physics, the idea that a complete and comprehensive physical 
theory of all physical phenomena is at least theoretically  possible (Kim (1998) page 40 mind) 
36
 Strand (2007) page 58 
37
 Kim (2005) page 47 
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energy and momentum,
38
 although these underlying physical laws are not explicitly 
stated in his works. The law of conservation states that; 
 
 Every physical system is conservative or is part of a larger system that is conservative, where a system 
is conservative if its total amount of energy and linear momentum can be redistributed, but not altered 
in amount, by changes that happen in it.
39
  
 
Since Kim considers causation in terms of the transfer of energy or momentum, his 
assumption is that if ‘external’ causes where to contribute energy or momentum to a 
closed physical system, this would violate the conservation-principle. Only 
fundamental physical forces, intrinsic to the system concerned are allotted causal 
powers here.  His understanding of causal closure has important implications for how 
he interprets the supervenience-relation between so called higher and lower 
properties, and I will return to this after an explication of his argument against the 
credibility of non-reductive physicalism. 
 
The second principle utilized is that of causal exclusion, which states that; “If an 
event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause of e 
(unless this is a genuine case of causal overdetermination)”40 or, in another 
formulation: “No single event can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at 
any given time (-unless it is a genuine case of causal overdetermination)”.41 While the 
previous principle gives the rationale for choosing P over M as the cause of a physical 
event, this principle gives grounds for why there must be choosing in the first place. 
Although cases of overdetermination can be argued to be frequent in the everyday 
world,
42
 they concern causes that are sufficiently independent so as to be outside the 
domain of the principle. The relation of supervenience between M and P entail that 
they are not distinct in the manner demanded in order to be considered on the same 
terms as cases of “ordinary overdetermination” and it is rather the relation between 
the two causal candidates that demands explanation. The use the causal exclusion-
                                                 
38
 Gibb (2010) page 363 
39
 Ibid. page 370 
40
 Kim (2005) page 17  
41
 Ibid. page 42 
42
 Anders Strand presents an example of a tabletop remaining 92 cm above the floor in virtue of four 
legs, but where removing one of these would still be sufficient to cause the tabletop to remain 92 cm 
off the floor. Here causal sufficiency is preserved throughout certain changes of the cause.(Strand 
(2007) page 79) 
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principle can be put to depend on how one interprets distinct and sufficient, and the 
exploration of these two terms has resulted in a welter of differing interpretations.  I 
will not explore the different understandings of distinct and sufficient causes 
specifically here as I believe that the technicalities will lead my astray from the issue 
at hand. What is important here is that postulating two distinct causes occurring at the 
same time , that both claim to be sufficient for an effect, as the non-reductive 
supervenience-relation is taken to do, apparently leave us with an overabundance of 
causes.  
 
Before I proceed to Kim’s explication of why mental causes are left redundant when 
these principles are taken into consideration I would like to briefly state the common 
conception of the events that do the causing. Events are here considered as property-
instantiations, that is, they are triplets of objects, properties and times.
43
 According to 
Kim, it is at the level of events as property-instantiations that the causation takes 
place; “(…) causation is after all is a relation between property or kind-instances, not 
between properties or kinds as such.”44 His view of the property-instantiations or 
events doing the causing is central in the theory he presents as an answer to the mental 
causation and intimately related to his interpretation of the causal closure principle. 
For the same reason that I do not wish to go deeper into explicating the notions of 
sufficient and distinct, I will not be treating the notion of causality in general any 
further at this point. In a sense the underlying theme of this paper is the competing 
understandings of causality offered by Kim’s reductive account and those non-
reductive theories I will be presenting later on and so the content of this notion will 
hopefully become clear in the process of treating these. For now I shall simply state 
the interpretation of causality as it is most often pictured in approaches to physicalism 
that rest on the explanatory power of classical physics;  
 
Causality, on the usual analysis, is a succession of events sufficient to permit micro-deterministic state 
determination of the system involved. That is, the system is causal if a linear sequence can be traced 
from event to event leaving no “unfilled” gaps in the chain of events. Linear or causal interactions 
among contiguous events are micro-deterministic and involve a direct transference of energy from one 
                                                 
43
 Strand (2007) page 86 
44
 Kim (2005) page 58 
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event to the next in the chain. “Billiard ball” interaction is paradigmatic of causal interaction in both 
respects.
45
 
 
1.3 Kim’s supervenience-argument: 
 
As mentioned the debate between non-reductive physicalists and those with a 
reductionistic perspective pivots on their differing views on the relation between the 
mental and physical properties of causes of physical events. Kim’s supervenience-
argument is the most influential version of what is termed the exclusion-argument, 
where the two principles presented in the previous section are utilized in order to 
challenge the causal commitments of non-reductive physicalism.
46
 His goal is to 
demonstrate that the premise of psycho-physical irreducibility must be rejected in 
order remain within the parameters of physicalism
47
 as set by the two preceding 
principles. Kim starts off with the assumption the instances of mental properties cause 
other mental properties, an assumption that is independent of adherence to any 
physicalist position but that is implied in the commonsense idea that thoughts cause 
other thoughts in the sense that there is some sort of relation between for example the 
belief that there is a sandwich in the fridge and the desire to eat it. Supervenience 
entails that every such mental instance is dependent on, or realized by an underlying 
physical occurrence, such that the mental event could not have occurred had not the 
physical event been present and it is here that physicalism enters the picture.
48
 It 
follows from this that in order to cause a subsequent mental event (M*), the mental 
event considered as a cause must go the way of the physical realizer of M*, that is, 
P*;  
 
Given that P* is present on this occasion, M* would have be there no matter what happened before; as 
M’s supervenience-base the instantiation of P* at t in and itself necessitates M*’s occurrence at t. This 
would be true even if M*’s putative cause M, had not occurred- unless, that is, the occurrence of M 
had something to do with the occurrence of P* on this occasion. 
49
 
                                                 
45
 Weimer (1976) page 24    
46
 Strand (2007) page 48 
47
 Kim (2005) page 65  
48
 Ibid. page 41 
49
 Ibid. page 39-40  
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So the supervenience-relation entails that it is not possible to have level-bound causal 
autonomy; any causal relation at levels higher than the bottom level (L) entails a 
cross-level, L to L-1 causal relation.
50
 Here lies the rationale behind the idea that 
mental causation is a question of downward causation. The question is then how M 
can exhibit any causal power in its own right in relation to the occurrence of 
subsequent and related mental events (M*) and in that regard how it can effect the 
physical events that determine M*. The problem that here presents itself is brought 
about by the combined adherence to the irreducibility of causally efficacious 
supervenient mental properties and to the principles of exclusion and causal closure. 
According to the first of these principles M and P can not both be considered 
sufficient causes of P*, and according to the second the physical substrate of M must 
pre-empted M in being the cause of P* if they must be chosen between. What we end 
up with on this argument is but one horizontal causal chain being on the physical 
level, and two vertical dependence-relations between M and P and M* and P*. What 
appears to be causal relations between the higher-level mental properties give way to 
casual processes on the ‘lower’ physical level, and the mental causes of physical 
events are left redundant by their physical causes. The two mental elements involved 
in this picture play no role in shaping the causal structure, they only supervene on 
properties that constitute the structure.
51
  
 
Kim summarizes the argument in saying that; “the assumption of casual exclusion and 
lower-level causal closure disallow downward causation”,52 and so “putative higher-
level causal relations give way to causal processes at a lower level.”53 We are left with 
two vertical dependence-relations and but one horizontal causal chain, which must 
necessarily reside at the causally closed P-level. In presenting the tension between the 
vertical determination and horizontal causation present in the supervenience-relation
54
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51
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54
 Kim expresses the tension here; ”So we have two purportive determinative relationships orthogonal 
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(Kim (2005) page 36) 
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he wishes to point out that “there are inevitable causal entanglements between 
different levels, raising all sorts of issues concerning causal closure, competition, and 
exclusion, and forcing some significant philosophical choices.”55 These are issues he 
believes that the non-reductionistic physicalists must come to terms with if they are to 
come up with a positive account of multilevel causation. As stated in the beginning of 
this paper, being a physicalist means explaining the role of mental properties in 
relation to those that are characterized physically, and as seen in the supervenience-
argument such a causal power must necessarily be downward. Calling the type of 
causation required of the mental ‘downward’ relates to a certain way of viewing the 
structure of the world. 
  
SECTION TWO 
 
2.1 Ontological physicalism and the multilayered world 
 
 
The term downward causation is related to a conceptualization of mental properties as 
situated at a higher level or being of a higher order than those purely physical,
56
 which 
rests on the idea of a multilayered model of the world where the bottom level is often 
considered to consist of elementary particles, “or whatever our best physics is going 
to tell us are the basic bits of matter of which all material things are composed”.57 
Each level above that has certain properties that are characteristic for that level, for 
example metabolism at the level of cellular or higher biological levels and mental 
properties such as consciousness at level of higher organisms.
58
 This ontological 
scheme is a common way of conceptualizing the world, shared by many of the 
participants in the discussion on the mind-body problem but they differ as to the how 
they view the relation between the different levels and ultimately the fundamental 
bottom layer, as well as the ontological status ascribed to each. The kind of 
physicalism one adheres to dictates the framework that these relations are to be 
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structured by. The central point of emergentism is that although each level is 
structured out of material particles, the substance of each level being wholly 
composed of the lower levels and ultimately kinds of elementary particles, the laws 
governing these lower levels are not sufficient to capture the goings on at higher 
levels.
59
 
60
 
 
Kim’s ontological physicalism pictures the hierarchical structure as based on an 
ordering relation that is mereological, which on his account means that that entities 
belonging to any level above the very bottom, defined as the level where the entities 
have no physically significant proper parts,
61
 has exhaustive decomposition into 
entities belonging to the lower levels.
62
 He defines his ontological physicalism as; 
”The view that bits of matter and their aggregates in space-time exhaust the contents 
of the world.”63 On this ontological scheme the entities belonging to the bottom level 
have priority over those at any level above, and his belief that such higher-level 
entities necessarily have exhaustive decomposition entails that they can not be 
anything but aggregates of parts situated at that level. The idea that any such existent 
has decomposability as its defining feature is contained in the claim that properties of 
any existent above the bottom level is micro-structural or micro-based, which means 
that; 
 
P is a micro-based property just in case P is the property of being completely decomposable into non-
overlapping parts, a1, a2, …. an, such that P1(a1), P2(a2)….,Pn(an), and R(a1….an). 64  65  
 
Further, he lays out the three defining characteristics of any material object that has 
proper parts and is therefore decomposable into these. All objects above the bottom 
level can be described in terms of the basic particles that constitute it, the intrinsic 
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properties of these particles, plus the relations that configure these particles into a 
structure with “substantial unity”.66 Nothing more is required in order to give a full 
description of any macro-object, and so once these intrinsic characteristics are fixed 
the properties characterising their behaviour is also fixed. When connected to his 
belief that entities above a theoretical bottom level has decomposability as its defining 
feature, the supervenience-relation is expressed as mereological supervenience. This 
is the doctrine that properties of the whole are fixed by the properties and relations 
that characterize their parts,
67
 and so “a general claim of supervenience then becomes 
the Democritean atomistic doctrine that the world is the way it is because the micro 
world is the way it is.”68 Because of his belief that it is at the level of micro-physics 
that one is most likely to find the closure conditions required of the physical, the 
fundamental parts (those which cannot be further divided), must have ontological 
priority over the wholes they as aggregates constitute.  
 
The importance he places on the idea that microphysics can adequately describe all 
that is to be considered as physical is reflected in his definition of physicalism seen 
above,
69
 and means that the mind-body relation, as an instance of mereological 
supervenience
70
 can be sufficiently captured by the description of the microphysical 
properties of the subvenient base. He states that he expects most emergentists to 
accept mereological supervenience, which involves that one must agree to the 
assumption that the micro-structural or micro-based properties adequately describe 
also higher-order entities.
71
 
72
 As I attempt to show later on, it is exactly this belief 
that complex physical systems such as the living organism are exhaustively described 
through its microstructural constitution and the intrinsic micro-causal relations that 
take place there that are challenged by certain non-reductive physicalist theories.  
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2.2 The collapsing of levels. 
 
 
Even though he expresses supervenience as that of all intrinsic properties of an entity 
at any level higher than the bottom supervening on the total micro-based properties of 
that entity at the bottom level,
73
 the levels he refers to here are not to be understood in 
terms of a hierarchy of causally autonomous objects and properties. The demand of 
decomposability entails that there are no genuine “levels” as such over and above that 
of the bottom, and any talk of higher-level micro-based properties must be understood 
in accordance with his belief that the only genuinely causally effective properties are 
at the level described by microphysics. The microstructural definition of macro-
objects and mereological supervenience entails that there is nothing more needed to 
explain the behaviour of the whole than the properties of the basic parts and their 
relations. In this way, the bottom level is in effect the universal domain wherein all 
physically describable macro-objects are contained. Such a bottom level becomes 
universal through the demand of decomposability and more specifically when 
characterized in causal terms such as the mental, through the reductive identity of 
such functional properties with their microstructural realizers.
74
 In other words, there 
is not really any collapsing going on as there is not any genuine causation going on 
above the causally closed level of microphysics;  
 
So as far as the supervenience argument goes, the bottom level of fundamental particles (assuming that 
this is the only level that is causally closed) is always the reference physical domain; there is no step-
by-step devolution of causal relations from level to level.
75
  
  
Everything that is dealt with in fundamental physics or reducible, in some broad but 
clear sense, to fundamental properties can be included in the physical domain
76
 Kim 
states, and lays out three conditions for being allowed within this domain. Those 
existents that are related to basic physical entities as aggregates, micro-based 
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properties decomposable into these, or second-order properties defined over physical 
properties can claim physical status.
77
 Common to all these is their reductive identity 
with the entities dealt with in fundamental physics. On account of this the macro-
properties and those that realize them are constituents of the same objects at the same 
time, so they must be situated at the same level of the micro-macro hierarchy.
78
 
79
 It 
makes more sense to speak of orders than layers he says,
80
 because there is in reality 
only one genuine level here, that of the bottom, which is “thought to consist of 
elementary particles, or whatever our best physics are going to tell us are the basic 
bits of matter out of which all material things are composed”.81 82  
 
Kim’s understanding of the scope and nature of the microphysical domain sets the 
stage for a reductionistic explication of mental causation, where he seeks to 
reductively identify the causal power of the mental with that of its microstructurally 
defined realizers. At its basis is the ontological priority of the parts of the whole, the 
parts being fundamentally those which can be explained solely in terms of a causally 
closed micro-universe. While causation taking place here can be termed macro in the 
sense that it concerns the object as a whole, the object as a whole is nothing but an 
aggregate of composite basic particles and their intrinsic relations. 
 
 
2.3 Non-reductive physicalism again  
 
 
Non-reductive physicalism on the other hand credit properties of existents on higher 
levels of complexity with a causal standing that can not be derived from the powers of 
their constituents, not even taken as an aggregate. In other words they are against the 
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idea that mereological supervenience based on the microstructural definition of 
macro-objects capture the nature of the physical world in its entirety; 
 
When we speak of non-reductive materialism we are considering a position that subscribes to the basic 
physicalist idea that everything that exists is constituted by matter, there being no “non-physical” 
forces at play, but that when such material systems reach a certain degree of complexity they begin to 
exhibit novel properties not reducible to the properties of their constituents.
83
   
 
They stand in opposition to the idea that physics adequately capture the nature of the 
physical world and consider emergent phenomena at higher levels to be neither 
predictable nor explainable on the basis of their emergence base, and accordingly they 
provide additional causal structure to the world not describable solely in terms of 
physical science. The forces are commonly considered to be ‘configurational forces’ 
which come about as organizational complexity increases, not through the paring 
relations of particles that physics (as pictured by Kim) is concerned with.
84
 As stated 
in my very brief treatment of the concept of causation underlying Kim’s notion of 
physicalism, in physical science causation is often pictured as a linear relation among 
spatio-temporal particulars in direct “contact” with each other85. Essentially the effect 
is here the sum of its causes, being decomposable into elements which have a one-to-
one correspondence.
86
 Configurational forces on the other hand are not grasped within 
this conception of causation, having the characteristics of non-linearity
87
 and 
extrinsicness. It is in terms of these forces that mental causation is formulated in the 
emergentist accounts related in this paper. According to the non-reductionist mental 
phenomena have sufficient causal power in a physically relevant sense so as to be 
considered a substantial existent even within a physical world, which entails that the 
notion of the physical world must be expanded beyond that which is captured by 
Kim’s ontological physicalism. It is a challenge to the idea expressed by Kim that the 
world consists nothing but bits of matter described by the laws of physics. 
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As shown in the supervenience-argument the discussion revolves around whether the 
causal powers credited to higher-level existents on the non-reductionist account 
actually can claim a substantial place within a physicalist ontological scheme or 
whether non-reductive physicalism is an oxymoron. Of special concern in this paper 
is whether the activity of living systems can be adequately described without being 
reductively identified with the activity of its intrinsic material parts. Kim himself 
believes that there are only two genuine options if one does not wish to leave 
physicalism behind; reducibility or epiphenomenalism: 
  
That is, if you have already made your commitment to a version of physicalism worthy of the name, 
you must accept the reducibility of the psychological to the physical, or, failing that, you must consider 
the psychological as falling outside your physically respectable ontology.
88
  
 
The counterclaim of modern non-reductionist physicalists is that; “the laws of physics 
and chemistry can not account for the specific kinds of living things- that is, the 
particular configurations of matter in organisms”.89  
 
2.4 The physical and the mental 
 
Ultimately the goal is to reach an understanding of how the mental is situated within 
biological life as a physical entity, as the naturalistic commitments require of those 
theories that I will be utilizing in this pursuit. In this regard it is of course pertinent to 
understand what is signified by the use of the terms mental and physical. While it its 
clear that what Kim considers as physical is intimately connected to his notion of 
decompositionality and therein the relation to the entities treated by the fundamental 
physical sciences, it is apparently a fuzzier concept when used by non-reductive 
physicalists. As mentioned above, it is the configurational forces of matter that is of 
central importance to them. It is important to note that non-reductive physicalists 
adhere to the general tenet of physicalism that the world is wholly composed by 
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matter
90
 and they do not consider emergent ontological entities but rather emergent 
levels of causal efficacy.
91
 All existents are still physical, but some have 
characteristics not held by its microstructural relations. 
 
Concerning the mental, a central feature is that of intentionality.
92
 Franz Brentano 
considered the characteristic of intentionality to be the mark of the mental
93
 pointing 
to the capacity of the mind to intend the nonexistent
94
, the directedness of mental 
states being what makes it so difficult to place within a physicalist framework.
95
 For 
how could some physical thing in the head come to bear the aboutness-relation to 
anything out in the external world?
96
 A common answer is that the semantical content 
of such relations can be identified with some state of the brain that represents the state 
of affairs instantiated in the world.
97
 This suggestion begets a number of problems, 
such as the mentioned issue of how they can represent things that have no real-world 
correlate, as well as how to exactly representations are structured out of basic brain-
features. Here the concern is that of mental causation, that is, how intentional states 
such as reasons, desires or intentions cause an action (more generally expressed as 
how reasons can be causes). They stand apart from the physical processes underlying 
them on account of their semantic dimension
98
 and the relational or extrinsic character 
of their nature.  Related is the notion of normativity, the prescription of value to the 
semantic content of intentional states or relations, which is as well difficult to capture 
in a physical world of bits of matter described by laws of nature. Kim puts the 
problem of intentional causation in terms of supervenience-relation assumed for 
mental properties. The issue he states is that while the internal cause of physical 
behaviour must be supervenient on the total internal state of the organism at that time 
(implying that two people in an identical such state must emit identical motor-output), 
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having identical intrinsic properties does not necessarily mean that two people will 
instantiate the same semantical properties. This is because the instantiation of a 
semantic property is essentially a relational fact involving details about the 
organism’s history and its environmental conditions.99 If, as the supervenience-
argument seems to make unavoidable, all causation must involve physically 
respectable, intrinsic properties of the system; “How can extrinsic, relational 
properties be causally efficacious in behaviour production?”.100  
 
2.5 Aspects of reductionism 
 
Since the central point of contention between the two approaches to physicalism 
outlined above is reduction it will be useful to present an overview of the different 
elements contained in this notion. Nancy Murphy and Warren Browns account offers 
a clear and precise summary which I will utilize for this purpose. They divide the term 
into five related elements, which are as follows; (partly quoted)
101
 
1. Methodological reductionism: a research strategy for analyzing the thing to 
be studied in terms of its parts. Early modern science considered this the only 
legitimate approach to any scientific subject of study and it is the preferred 
research strategy for those that adhere to the belief that the understanding of 
all entities can only come from the understanding of its physio-chemical 
parts
102
. This research-strategy dictates certain limitations on scientific 
research, such that the only acceptable evidence is that which is definable and 
defensible in terms of physical science and that the pursuit of this evidence 
should be conducted on simple and relatively isolated systems, assuming that 
the behaviour of large and complex systems is nothing but or equals the sum 
total of the behaviour of its constituent parts.
103
 As I will attempt to show later 
on in this paper, the recognition of the difficulty in understanding specifically 
biological concepts, and hereunder the as the notions of cognition and 
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intentionality, has demanded a complementary approach to this tradition 
methodology of science.
104
  
2. Epistemological reductionism: the view that laws or theories pertaining to 
the higher-levels of the hierarchy of the sciences can (and should) be shown to 
follow from lower level laws, and ultimately from the laws of physics. So this 
aspect of reductionism is a related to the previous, which dictates research-
strategies. In the period dominated by the deductive-nomological model of 
science the search for such underlying laws was the rule. Within this paradigm 
Ernest Nagel developed what became the most pervasive way of considering 
reduction. Nagel was more concerned with the reduction of theories than with 
the phenomena within these, and this reduction was formulated as the logical 
or mathematical derivation of the laws of the theory targeted for reduction 
from the laws of the base theory.
105
 This required bridge-laws connecting the 
predicates of the two theories as their vocabularies were disjoint, but these 
bridge-laws themselves were left unexplained.  Given the widely accepted 
nomological requirement on causal relations, namely the condition that 
“events standing in a causal relation must instantiate a causal law”106 then in a 
broader sense the formulation of reduction in terms of laws is still relevant; 
 
       The general question is whether the theories an experimental laws formulated in one field of 
science can be shown to be special cases of theories and laws formulated in some other branch 
of science. If such is the case, the former branch of science is said to have been reduced to the 
latter. This is the sense in which philosophers of science most often discuss questions of 
reduction.
107
 
 
3. Causal reductionism: the view that the behaviour of the parts of a system 
(ultimately, the parts studied by subatomic physics) is determinative of the 
behaviour of all higher-level entities. Thus, this is the thesis that all causation 
in the hierarchy is ‘bottom-up’. The behaviour of an entity is determined by 
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the behaviour (or the laws governing the behaviour) of its parts.
108
 This kind 
of reductionism comes to expression in Kim’s notion of mereological 
supervenience and it is this aspect that is the central element of discussion in 
this paper. 
4. Ontological reductionism: the view that higher-level entities are nothing but 
the sum of their parts. This position thesis is further divided into two distinct 
positions: 
4a) When one goes up the hierarchy of levels, no new kinds of non-physical 
“ingredients” need to be added to produce higher-level entities from lower. 
Differences on this position are what distinguish physicalism from dualist 
thesis that posits “vital forces” or “entelechies” to explain how living beings 
arise from non-living materials. In order to be within the physicalist realm one 
must claim adherence to this version of ontological reductionism, but this does 
not necessarily imply that one must submit to the following aspect of 
reductionism. 
4b) “atomist reductionism”: The claim that only the entities at the lowest level 
are really real; higher-level entities- molecules, cells, and organisms- are only 
composite structures (temporary aggregates) made out of atoms. The entities 
at the bottom of the ontological scale have priority over the things they 
constitute.
109
 Kim’s view of macro-properties as being mereological 
aggregates of their base-properties, exhaustively described in terms of its basic 
particles, their intrinsic properties as well as the relations between them, 
implies that he belongs here. 
 
As well as the term physicalism and causation, there is no general agreement as to 
how reduction is to be understood but this general way of dividing the different 
elements contained in the term capture the main points of reductionism. Given that 
many believe existents must be considered in terms of their causal standing, 
ontological reductionism is intimately tied to that of causal reductionism, which in 
turn relates to epistemological reductionism through the requirement that causal 
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relations are formulated in terms of laws or expressed as such. Lastly epistemological 
reductionism concerns methodological reductionism as it is this that dictates the 
research-strategies for formulating these laws. In this paper I will not be concerned 
with strictly differentiating the diverse aspects, as considering causal reductionism 
inevitably will have epistemological and methodological connotations.   
In addition to the four elements laid out above, there are two main ways of utilizing 
reduction. The first is exemplified in the type identity theory of Smart and Feigl's 
mind-brain identity thesis,
110
 which was briefly mentioned in the introduction. On the 
other hand we have token reductionism which does not aim for the all encompassing 
reductionism entailed by the type-version. By limiting the reduction of a given higher-
order element to certain contexts
111
 this kind of reduction is able to resists the multiple 
realization arguments levelled against type-identity reductions to a greater degree. It is 
also a kind of reductionism that all physicalists can safely admit to, given that 
physicalism in its broadest sense states that all concrete entities are physical entities. 
On Kim’s token physical reductionism it is the local reduction of mental events to 
their physical realizers that is of interest. Instantiations of mental properties at a 
certain time are reducible to instantiations of their micro-particulars at that time, and 
this reduction is relative to the species or structure under consideration.
112
 Concerning 
the possibility of reduction of mental properties to their physical realizers, Kim 
believes the best solution is through functionalization.   
 
 
2.6 Kim’s functionalism: 
 
Kim’s suggestion for a solution to the problem of mental causation posed by the 
supervenience-argument is to consider mental properties as second-order functional 
properties with physical realizers,
113
 and by this providing a positive account of how 
the two are related. For Kim, reduction is essentially functionalization and it is the 
functionalization of mental properties that enable them to escape the supervenience-
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argument.
114
  By positing that instantiations of any mental property is reductively 
identifiable with the synchronous instantiation of some physical property that satisfies 
the causal specifications of the mental property he believes that his commitment to 
causal closure can be reconciled with what he considers to be robust mental 
causation.
115
 Through functional reduction the mental can be preserved as part of the 
physical domain while not being eliminated as a genuine existent. He views his 
functional reductionism as ‘conservative’ rather than ‘eliminative’, meaning that M is 
not something “over and above” P in the emergentist sense while still being conserved 
to a certain degree. He believes that this type of reduction requires identities, because; 
“to conserve X as Y means that X is Y”.116 According to this approach mental 
properties are second order properties that consist in having other properties that have 
certain relations to one another, stated as;  
 
F is a second-order property over a set B of base (or first-order) properties iff F is the property of 
having some property P in B such that D(P), where D specifies a condition on members of B.
117
  
 
The functional reduction of a higher-order property E to the domain B of properties 
serving as the reduction base is achieved by way of a three step process. First E must 
be defined by its causal relations to properties in the reduction base B, which can be 
stated as such:  
 
Having E= def  Having some property P in B such that (i) C1 ,…. Cn cause P to be instantiated, and (ii) 
P causes F1 ,…, Fm  to be instantiated. (We allow either (i) or (ii) to be empty).118.119  
 
The aim is to make E relational (as in non-intrinsic) with respect to other properties in 
B. The E’s being instantiated is for a property P to be instantiated, this instantiation 
bearing causal or nomic relations to the instantiations of a specific set of properties in 
the base domain.
120
. Kim uses the functional reduction of the gene to DNA molecules 
as an example. Here the gene is first defined in terms of the casual work that the 
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property is to perform, that is, being a mechanism that encodes and transmits genetic 
information
121
.  This is a purely conceptual step, simply reinterpreting the property to 
be reduced in terms of the causal work it is to perform. It does not involve any 
empirical or factual information about the property subject to functionalization,
122
 just 
establishing a conceptual or definitional connection between E and the selected causal 
role.
123
 According to Kim, this step in and of itself is necessary and sufficient for 
functional reducibility. Whether the property in question can be reduced or not, that 
is, if there are actual lower-level mechanisms there that perform the assigned causal 
work is an independent issue that is a matter of scientific research.
124
  
 
The second step is to identify the properties serving as the realizers of E in B, the 
properties that in the reduction base that perform the specified causal task. Whether a 
given property realizes a functional property is an empirical, contingent matter, and in 
order to avoid multiple realization worries they are restricted to certain contexts. As 
long as the realizing base-property stands in the right causal or nomological relations 
to other properties it can serve as its realizer or, as Kim puts it; “Any mechanism that 
gets activated by the right input and that, when activated, triggers the right response 
serves as a realizer of a psychological capacity or function”.125 
 
The second order properties are defined in terms of the causal task that is to be 
performed by the first-order realizer of that property and since these functions can be 
performed by different physical structures in different systems the realizers can be 
multiply realized, that is, the reductions are local. In systems with similar 
microstructures however the realization relation must be equal because, as 
mereological supervenience requires; “once the system’s physical constitution and the 
prevailing laws of nature are fixed, that fixes whether or not P realizes M in that 
system”.126 So, different realizers of the same functional property can be found in 
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different organisms, and even in the same person over the span of a lifetime.
127
  
Science has discovered that in terrestrial organisms the DNA molecules are the 
mechanism that performs the task of encoding and transmitting genetic information. 
Whether this realizer of the gene can be generalized to species of other worlds is not 
of interest here, unless such species where to become the subject of research. Unlike 
reductions that are postulated as concerning all possible worlds, this type of reduction 
will only be as broad as science specifies it. In other words, it is nomologically 
necessary but metaphysically contingent. 
 
 Thirdly, a theory must be produced to explain how realizers of E perform the causal 
task that is constitutive of E. These two steps are not independent of each other. As 
with step two, this is a matter for the relevant sciences, in the case of the gene and 
DNA molecules it is up to molecular biology to provide an answer to how DNA is 
able to perform the causal task specified by the gene. 
 
On the functional model the causal power of every instance of some mental property 
is nothing over and above that of its realizer on that occasion.
128
 In essence it 
identifies the functional M property with the P-property that realizes it.
129
 
130
  
However, Kim claims that the M to M* causation remains very genuine and real, in 
virtue of being the very same causation as P->P*. The reduction collapses the two 
levels into one and there is here one causal relation, not two.
131
 This reflects his 
answer to the supervenience-argument in terms of microstructural decomposability, 
where the properties of macro-objects by their constitution of decomposability is 
identical to an aggregate of their micro-particulars, their causal power being the sum 
of that of these.
132
 While the all-encompassing Nagelian bridge laws which have been 
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the reference point for much of the discussion on reduction suffered under the 
arguments of multiple realizations, Kim believes that moving from bridge-law 
reduction to identity reduction by way of functionalization has made reduction less 
vulnerable to this kind of argument. Because it is the second-order property can have 
different realizers dependent on the system it is related to, the concept itself will be as 
heterogeneous as the heterogeneity of its diverse realizers.
133
  The search for the 
specific realizers is only concerned with a limited number of systems, and does not 
attempt generalizations beyond that which is scientifically responsible.  
 
It is important to note that, in line with his view that all causation takes place at the 
level of instances, Kim differentiates the higher-order property itself and the instances 
of that property. It is the instances of such properties that are treated as functional 
reducible; 
 
(…) system s has E, in virtue of s’s instantiating one of its realizers, say Q. Now s’s having E on this 
occasion just is its having some property meeting causal specification C, and in this particular instance 
s has Q, where Q meets specification C. Thus s’s having E on this occasion is identical with its having 
Q on that occasion. There is no fact of the matter about s’s having E on this occasion over and above 
s’s having Q. Each instance of E, therefore, is an instance of one of E’s realizers, and all instances of E 
can be partitioned into Q1-instances, Q2-instances,…, where the Q’s are E’s realizers. Hence the E-
instances reduce to Qi-instances.
134
  
 
While he believes that the instances of higher-order properties retain their causal 
power in virtue of being conservatively reduced to their realizers, he suggest 
eliminating E as a genuine property and only recognizing the concept or expression E, 
devoid of causal powers of its own. Given the multiple realizations of its instances E 
becomes causal or nomologically heterogeneous, making it unfit to figure in laws and 
therefore disqualified as a useful scientific property.
135
 The second-order concepts 
designate the first-order properties in he reduction base disjunctively.
136
 Anders 
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Strand raises the concern that it is problematic to establish identities between second-
order properties and their realizers when this identity-base is viewed as the disjuncts 
of their first-order realizers.
137
 It seems to include causally irrelevant details because 
the instantiation of a disjunctive property by an object supervenes on a singular 
disjunct which is causally sufficient for the effect, and accordingly the disjunctive 
property is causally excluded by its disjuncts.
138
 It is a legitimate concern, but I will 
not go further into an exposition on the understandings of disjunctive here as I 
consider the problems facing mental properties construed as second-order properties 
in the next section. Kim does seem to admit that there cannot be any general property-
identities in functional reduction
139
  in the following quote; 
 
Now, any instance of M must be ether a P1 instance or a P2 instance, and this means that instances of 
M are not going to show the kind of causal/nomological homogeneity we expect from a scientific kind. 
In short, multiply realizable properties are causally and nomologically heterogeneous kinds, and this at 
bottom is the reason for their inductive unprojectability and ineligibility as causes.
140
 
 
Whereas the instantiation of a particular mental property is functionally reducible to a 
certain instance of its realizer (relative to the specific structure under consideration, 
given that it is a local reduction), the specific realizer doing all the causal or 
explanatory work of M on that occasion, the property as such has no causal role to 
play of its own.
141
 Its role is merely communicative or descriptive; 
 
 When we use the functional characterization of pain (..) we let others know that we are referring to a 
state with certain input-output properties; a neural characterization of its realizer would in most 
ordinary contexts be useless and irrelevant.
142
  
 
While the second-order properties themselves are left causally inert and therefore not 
deserving of the name properties at all, (Kim prefers the term second-order concepts 
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or property-designators
143
), their instances provide us with an explanation of the 
supervenience-thesis; the mental supervene on the physical because  instances of 
mental properties are second-order functional properties with physical realizers (and 
no non-physical realizers).
144
  
 
 
2.7 What’s left of the mental in Kim’s account? 
 
In short Kim’s functional reductionism states that mental properties can be explained 
solely through the discovery of the causal or nomic relations obtaining in the base 
domain of its realizers.
145
 Because Kim adheres to Alexander’s dictum stating that for 
something to exists means that it must be able to make a difference to the world he 
must prescribe the mental with sufficient causal powers if they are not to be 
eliminated by their realizers.  But according to the causal inheritance principle, when 
a functional property is instantiated on a given occasion in virtue of one of its 
realizers being instantiated, then the causal powers of this instance of the functional 
property is identical with the causal powers of its realizer,
146
 and by this the causal 
powers of mental properties are reduced to the powers of its physical realizers.
147
  As 
mentioned above, the property itself is regarded by Kim as eliminatively reduced, 
ending up as a designator of its realizers with no causal efficacy apart from the 
particular instantiations of its realizers. Since all the causal or explanatory work done 
by an instance of M that occurs in virtue of the instantiation of a specific realizer is 
done by that realizer, we must ask what, if anything at all justifies us speaking of the 
mental at all, except as mere designators.
148
 It seems that the accusations he levels 
against Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism, namely that the fact that M is a 
mental event is causally irrelevant
149
, can be directed towards his reductive account of 
higher-order properties as well;  
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 Event m’s causal relations are fixed, wholly and exclusively, by the totality of its physical properties, 
and there is in this picture no causal work that m’s mental properties can, or need to, contribute.
150
  
 
Summarizing the consequences of his main positions, the demand of decomposability 
of higher-order properties means that the microstructure of a system determines its 
causal or nomic properties,
151
 whether they be considered in causal terms as 
functionable or more generally as macro-objects. As his adherence to mereological 
supervenience implies, it is the goings-on at a potential bottom level that determines 
the causal standing of all existents above this. The question is whether such a 
reduction based identity situated at the lowest conceivable level can satisfactory 
accommodate mentality within the causal structure of the physical world, as Kim 
believes that it does.
152
 To quote Strand:  
 
What we want from an account of mental causation is an understanding of how mental events are 
causes in virtue of their mental properties. This is not saved by claiming that mental events are causes 
in virtue of being identical to instances of physical properties.
153
  
 
In other words the reductive identification of such properties drains them of sufficient 
causal power. In his causal drainage-argument Ned Block expresses the broader worry 
that positing mental properties as second-order functional properties
154
 reductively 
identifiable with their microstructural realizers will leave us without any substantial 
causal powers above the fundamental level.
155
 The charge is that by identifying 
instances of micro-based macro-properties with instances of their microstructural 
properties
156
 Kim makes any causation above an eventual bottom level impossible, 
because, as Strand points out; “he is committed to a supervenience-base at the level of 
fundamental physics”.157 On Kim’s view of the dependence-relation between higher-
level micro-based properties and their “lower-level counterparts”,158 all intrinsic 
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properties of O (being a macro-object), at any level higher than L, (levels understood 
in terms of “modes of decomposition of material objects into physically significant 
constituents”159) supervene on the total micro-based property of O at level L.160  
Stated in another way; “for any object O. O’s micro-based properties at level L 
supervene on O’s total micro-based property at level L*, where L*<L”.161 
  
Concerning mental properties construed functionally, the realizers of such second-
order properties must be superveniently dependent on lower-order realizers and so 
forth until we reach such a stipulated bottom level. They are included in this notion of 
supervenience in virtue of the first-order realizers they supervene on
162
 being micro-
structural properties and therefore necessarily being decomposable onto the lowest 
level.
163
 Given the causal inheritance-principle all causal powers must ultimately 
reside on this level, either directly or through supervenience on intermediate orders or 
levels. Consequently, if there is no such level and matter is indefinably divisible then 
there will be no causal powers anywhere, because every member of an infinite series 
of supervenient properties will have a lower member to which it cedes its causal 
power, a counterintuitive notion that puts the existence of everything in peril. The 
threat posed by first-order realizers to pre-empt the causal claims of the second-order 
properties they realize is a consequence of the supervenience-argument and concerns 
all second-order properties, whether functional or not.
164
 In fact, Kim does not believe 
that there is a sharp distinction between micro-based and functional properties, it is 
rather a matter of how they are defined, for as he says “there can surely be micro-
based properties some of whose constituent properties are functional properties.“165  
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2.8 Kim’s answer to the drainage-issue: 
 
 
The answer he gives to Blocks drainage-argument rests on his view that the bottom 
level must be taken to mean the causally closed fundamental level of microphysics, 
which through the reductive identity of all higher-level existents with the micro-
particulars that constitute them, is in effect the universal domain given that each level 
includes all mereological aggregates of entities at that level.
166
 To reiterate, Kim 
resists talk of ontological levels such as they are conceptualized by non-reductive 
physicalists because the closure-condition implies that there can not be talk of any 
genuinely ontological levels above that described by physics. By making any object 
or property above this level reductively identifiable, either through microstructural 
composition or second-order properties defined over physical properties, the closed 
physical domain will include such existents as well. Accordingly, causal powers can 
be held by aggregates of basic physical entities, micro-based properties decomposable 
into these, as well as second-order properties defined over physical properties.
167
 
Common to all these is that they are reductively identifiable with specific 
mereological configurations of this basic physical substrate, as the supervenience-
argument demands. 
 
If there is no fundamental physical level to serve as the universal domain by way of 
its causal closure, he points out, then the supervenience argument cannot get a 
toehold, because the required closure-premise is missing; “a causal collapse to the 
level below would occur only if the lower level is causally closed”.168 On the other 
hand, if such a potential ‘bottom level’ is available to serve as a reduction base for all 
identity-based reductions, then this reduction will be “the stopper that will plug the 
cosmic hole through which causal powers might drain away.”169 The idea behind this 
is that it is the irreducibility of supervenient properties to their subvenient base that 
makes their causal powers become pre-empted by those of the base-level,
170
 and by 
including both microstructurally and functionally defined macro-entities in the 
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physically closed domain of microphysics the pre-emption problem is resolved. He 
gives an example of how the reductive identity of water is continued from the 
commonly accepted ‘water=H2O’ downwards through that of H2O being a total 
micro-based property of water at the molecular level. This microstructural 
composition is further decomposable into the underlying level and so forth
171
. The 
lowest level being the union of all the micro-levels involved in the chain of 
identity,
172
 this retains the properties of macro-objects through mereological 
aggregation. 
  
Certainly the reductive identification of any macro-entity with such a union of causal 
powers relieves the tension between the vertical determination and the horizontal 
causation apparent in the supervenience-relation,
173
 but as I attempted to express 
previously, the main concern here is not the existence of any causal powers at all but 
whether the dependence of all ‘higher-level’ causation on such a bottom level gives 
sufficient room to claim the existence of mental properties at all in terms of causal 
powers. As Strand points out, resorting to a reduction base of properties based at the 
fundamental physical level in order to avoid the drainage-charge means no causation 
above this eventual fundamental level
174
 and as well it makes the macro-entities that 
supervene on very fragile, the slightest change in its microphysical realizers affecting 
the constitution of macro-properties. In short, Kim’s reductive identification of mental 
properties to those of a closed physical domain can be accused of leaving us without 
the kind of power required for postulating genuine causal agency. In Kim’s own 
words;  
 
When we try to relieve the said tension by saying that this instance of M caused P* to be instantiated 
(thereby causing M* to be instantiated), we must reflect on what this means in terms of the causal 
inheritance-principle. The principle says that this instance inherits all of its causal powers from the 
first-order property that realizes M on this occasion, and this first-order property is P. So this instance 
of M can claim to cause the P*-instance insofar as, and only insofar as, this instance of P causes it. And 
it becomes entirely unclear what could motivate us to countenance the M-instance, in addition to the P-
instance that realizes it, as a cause of the P* instance.
175
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2.9 Macro-causality and downward causation 
 
 
In fact, Kim does not seem too concerned with what is left of higher-order causal 
powers when such properties are interpreted as functional instances or with the causal 
power of micro-based macro-properties in general. On the latter he says that although 
the set of causal powers held by a micro-based property can be explained 
microstructurally, it does not mean that they are identical to the causal powers of its 
micro-constituents.
176
 These because they are identical to specific mereological 
configurations involving these micro-properties, not supervene on them taken 
individually or as a group.
177
 He gives an example of a baseball, being a composite 
structure of micro particles exercising ‘macro-causality’ by breaking a window. The 
causal powers of the baseball are not had by any of its constituent micro particles or 
proper parts although these powers are determined by and explainable in terms of its 
microstructural features. This does not banish macro-causation out of existence, he 
says, even though macro-causal relations are constituted by or composed of a bunch 
of micro-casual relations.
178
 So the inclusion of aggregates of micro-particulars in the 
closed physical domain means that macro-objects are allowed causal powers not had 
by any one of its constituents. 
 
Perhaps, macro-causal relations are constituted by, or composed of, a bunch of micro-causal relations: 
But that does not banish macro-causation out of existence any more than the fact that the baseball is 
composed of micro particles entails its non-existence.
179
  
 
Concerning second-order functional properties, he states that they are causally 
heterogeneous but not causally impotent,
180
 which I assume points to the fact that 
every instance of a functionalizable mental event gets its causal power from that of its 
realizer, because he can not be referring to any causal power of the second-order 
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properties themselves. Given that he states explicitly that these are not even to be 
considered as genuine properties, have only communicative relevance, mental 
properties as such can not have any causal powers above their individual realizers;  
“(…) the causal powers of mental properties turn out to be just those of their physical 
realizers, and there are no new causal powers brought into the world by mental 
properties”.181 So it is through the reductive identity to instances of their first-order 
physical realizers that mental properties construed functionally retain any causal 
power. “Each instance of M as a realizable property has exactly the causal power of 
its realizer on that occasion”182 he says, and the causal heterogeneity of M is given by 
the multiple realizability of its realizer, depending on the nature of the system that it is 
realized in. What then, is left of the causal power of the mental? Just that of the power 
of the realizer it is functionally identified with. Given that their first-order realizers 
are microstructural properties we are faced with the same problems concerning 
functionally reducible mental properties as with micro-based macro-properties in 
general. Kim dismisses this concern rather causally; saying that giving up any 
distinctive causal role of the mental is a steep price to pay but it is one that we will 
have to pay if we are to remain within the physicalist domain.
183
  
 
While the demand, demonstrated through the supervenience-argument, that “to cause 
any property (except at the very bottom level) to be instantiated, you must cause the 
basal condition from which it arises (either as an emergent or as a resultant)”184  is 
believed by Kim to be satisfactory answered through his commitment to the reductive 
identity of any physically respectable property to the elements treated by physical 
science, the idea that there can be any kind of reflexive downward causation that 
arises out of distinct higher-order levels themselves strikes him as incoherent. The 
type of downward causation that non-reductive theories demands cannot, on his view, 
be anything but paradoxical. It is not the kind affected by the baseball as a macro-
object causing a disturbance in the molecules of the glass it breaks, but downward 
causation in its reflexive sense, that of higher-order properties exercising causal 
powers on their own lower-order constituents that Kim considers to be incoherent, 
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and this incoherency arises from the apparent circularity present in such causal 
relations; 
 
After all, higher, level properties arise out of lower level conditions, and without the presence of the 
latter in suitable configurations, the former could not even be there. So how could these higher-level 
properties causally influence and alter the conditions from which they arise? Is it coherent to suppose 
that the presence of X is entirely responsible for the occurrence of Y (so Y’s very existence is totally 
dependent on X) and yet Y somehow manages to exercise a causal influence on X?
185
  
 
In this type of downward causation there is a mutual interdependence between the 
upward determining forces of the lower-order constituents and the downward causing 
forces working on these very same constituents, something which Kim terms an 
apparent absurdity.
186
 His argument against such downward causal force of the whole 
on its parts is structured along the same lines as the supervenience-argument, asking 
what work, given that the emergent arises from certain basal conditions, is left for the 
emergent that the lower-level base can not do itself, leaving the emergent causally 
inert. He says; “If an emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why can’t P 
displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M? Why can’t P do all the work in 
explaining why any alleged effect of M occurred?”.187 In his view, postulating any 
higher-order causes in addition to those operating on the basal level creates an 
overabundance of causes, and so according to the principles he considers as defining 
physicalism, the causal status of the dependent event is threatened by that of the event 
it depends on.
188
 As I will attempt to show in the following sections, it is possible to 
conceive of mental properties playing an indispensable role in the production of 
behaviour, and it is because without the presence of the mental as a downward force 
on the basal conditions these lower-order properties cannot do the job required of 
them. A job that is too great for the properties prescribed causal efficacy on Kim’s 
reductive account. Kim admits that his reductive identification of higher-order 
properties such as those of a mental character with their underlying realizers does not 
provide an all-encompassing solution to the mental causation issue or the mind-body 
problem in general, but he believes that it does better than any suggestion that the 
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non-reductionist can offer. As he demonstrates in his supervenience-argument, the 
non-reductionist need to come up with a credible way of presenting downward 
causation if they are to avoid falling pray to the charge of epiphenomenalism, or 
accept that he has come up with the best possible solution to a pervasive problem; 
 
The position is, as we might say, a slightly defective physicalism- physicalism manqué but not by 
much. I believe that this is as much physicalism as we can have, and that there is no credible alternative 
to physicalism as a general worldview. Physicalism is not the whole truth, but it is the truth near 
enough and near enough should be good enough. 
189
 
 
 
SECTION THREE 
 
 
3.1 Alicia Juarrero: The self-determination of dynamic systems 
 
 
Kim’s theory of mental causation is fundamented on his view of physicalism as 
ontological physicalism, where the world is believed to be of nothing but bits of 
matter and their aggregates, constrained by the laws of physics. Through the demand 
of reductive identification of any event or object above this level with the components 
describable in terms of basic particles and the laws governing them he leaves no room 
for causation that is not acquiescent to the belief that causal relations concern only 
determinate spatiotemporal pairing-relations between pairs of physically describable 
substances.
190
 This view of causation implies an ontological bias that favours the parts 
over that of the whole and that gives priority to existents intrinsic particulars over 
context-related processes. Alicia Juarrero represents a school that challenges these 
assumptions by claiming that conceptualizing all existents as fundamental particles or 
aggregates of such does not capture the nature of complex, herein biological, systems. 
The claim is that such systems demonstrate emergent macroscopic properties that de 
facto can not be derived from the laws and theories pertaining to the microphysical 
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level.
191
 They can only be understood by way of reflexive downward causation of the 
whole on its parts and this causal power can not be incorporated into Kim’s causal 
scheme. Juarrero and Kim have in common that they both consider causation as 
generation, or effective production
192
 versus mere counterfactual dependence, and 
they both agree that postulating two separate chains of causal power is a non-starter. 
But unlike Kim, Juarrero believes that there exists non-decomposable (as in not 
exclusively microstructurally defined) properties that have truly emergent causal 
powers in a physically relevant way. That is, the appearance of higher-level causality 
is more than just “regularities arising out of supervenience on causally linked lower-
levels”193 and higher-order powers194 can claim a substantial ontological status 
without tipping over into dualism. Accordingly, causality does not concern just 
pairing-relations among spatio-temporal particulars, although they are always realized 
through them. The central point is that such higher-order causal powers play an 
indispensable role in affecting the behaviour of complex systems, providing them 
with the conditions for their very existence. 
 
Juarrero synthesises findings in systems theory, nonlinear mathematics and 
emergence theory in an account of how complex systems as a whole can claim to a 
degree to be self-causing by way of the systems downwards efficacy on its parts. 
Unlike Kim’s functional or macro-properties that are explainable ultimately in terms 
of  their basal conditions and the fundamental physical laws describing these,
195
 the 
dynamic systems of Juarrero's account are constituted by a kind of circular, inter-level 
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causality, where system-level properties created by interactions among dynamical 
processes regulate and constrain the behaviour of the lower-level components; 
 
Second, when parts interact to produce wholes, and the resulting distributed wholes in turn affect the 
behaviour of the parts, inter-level causation is at work. Interactions among dynamical processes can 
create a systems-level organization with new properties that are not the simple sum of the components 
that create the higher level.
196
  
 
Whereas any higher-order properties in Kim were nothing but the causal power of its 
microphysical realizer at a given time, the systems-level organizational powers here 
can not be understood solely on the basis of the parts making up its material 
composition. The interactions of these components create unique powers that are not 
reductively explainable, but they are still physically explainable in the sense that they 
can not be considered as immaterial. 
 
In an article titled “Top-Down Causation and Autonomy in Complex Systems” 
Juarrero describes how such causation comes into play in dynamic systems. What 
characterizes such systems is a combination of flexibility on the part of the 
components, and the cohesion and robustness of the properties that integrate these 
parts into a unified whole. They are also characterized by evolvement, a constant 
movement to a greater degree of complexification, which involves decoupling; the 
properties of the whole are taken further away from the fundamental energetic forces 
that shape its basic material components, which implies increased independence from 
microphysical forces expressed in what physics terms the laws of nature. What then, 
are the conditions for such movement towards organizational self-determination, 
pinnacled in the achievement of human rational agency? The fundamental 
characteristic of systems with this potential is that they are sensitive to conditions 
other than those specified microstructurally. The entities treated by Kim are static 
entities, devoid of dynamic potential. Being defined exclusively microstructurally as 
describable in terms of the basic particles that constitute them, the intrinsic properties 
of these particles and the relations that configure these particles into a macro-
                                                 
196
 Juarrero (1999) page 5-6 (as quoted in Murphy and Brown (2009) page 86) 
  42 
structure,
197
 such structures are rigid entities that are isolated from interactive 
influences derived from context and historicity. Juarrero puts it this way;   
 
An agglomeration or conglomerate composed of particles independent of each other at equilibrium 
cannot differentiate into a complex organization with emergent properties, and particles related only in 
terms of relative position at best produce agglomeration or conglomerates. Since the properties of 
particles do not change when they are merely elements of a conglomerate, any novel characteristics of 
aggregates near equilibrium- such as temperature and pressure- are merely nominally emergent features 
of the statistical average of the large number of particles.
198
  
 
Movement is generated by openness, a quality that aggregates do not possess.  
Any inputs and outputs from such entities are nothing but elements of causal chains 
created by the parings of spatial affinity of their physical realizers, fuelled by 
energetic exchanges of basic particles. The parts making up the entity are not affected 
by the whole they partake in, and so the system as a whole remains closed off from 
interacting in a significant way with the environment. This closure means that such 
entities can not become ordered or complex through this become decoupled from the 
energetic exchanges from which they arise. It is only through openness that new 
levels of organizational complexity with novel downward affective power can come 
into existence. The externally relation-character of such open systems means that they 
can not be supervenient in Kim’s sense199 and the persistence of such open systems is 
fundamentally dependent on its relational characteristics, wherein the persistence is “a 
persistence of an organization of process, not of the constituents that undergo that 
processes”200. In other words, the understanding of components making up the 
material system is secondary to the understanding of how the system relates to its 
contextual conditions.  
  
The distinction between open and closed systems was originally proposed by Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy in the 1950s, the characteristic of an open system being that there is 
an inflow and outflow and therefore a change of the component materials.
201
 Contrary 
to his belief though, open systems are identified not only in the realm of biology but 
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also in that of chemistry. Ilya Prigogine and his associates received the Nobel Price in 
chemistry almost thirty years later for their studies of far-from-equilibrium dissipative 
structures.
202
 The discovery of how previously uncorrelated particles or process 
suddenly become coordinated and interconnected
203
 suggested an answer to how 
complex systems come about in the first place. The key to such jumps to higher levels 
of complexity (i.e. greater degree of interconnectivity) was seen as in the entities 
being non-linear open systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium. The basic form 
of downward causation takes place when open systems are driven far from 
equilibrium as a result of exchanges of matter and energy with their environment.
204
 
When the system reaches a critical point it will precipitate a phase change
205
 through 
which a top-down restrictive influence on the degrees of freedom of the constituent 
particles will emerge.
206
 The behaviour of the particles is constrained by its 
participation in a global structure. Being non-linear, the behaviour of such systems 
can not be predicted nor explained in terms of input-output relations (in the way Kim 
does) because the value of the input is not directly proportional to the sum of the 
inputs.
207
 Or, stated in another way; “every instance of non-linearity is an instance 
that cannot be derived aggregately from lower-level aggregates, i.e. every instance of 
non-linearity is an instance of emergence”.208 This is because the movement generated 
by the systems openness means that once the system has been started up at a 
particular point, its trajectory never returns to that point.
209
  
 
Open systems are necessarily those that are inherently far-from-equilibrium and 
therefore require constant interaction with an environment to be able to exist over 
time. Attempting to describe these with the explanatory resources of Kim’s reductive 
approach unavoidably leaves something important out, because the emergent macro-
properties of such systems cannot be derived from the laws and theories pertaining to 
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the micro-physical level.
210
 
211
 There is a substantial difference between the weakly 
emergent systems at the chemical level and the complex biological systems that 
actively modify their environment in order to ensure their continuous self-
construction and persistence.
212
 The requirement of openness is however common to 
all such complex systems. There must be an element of interaction with the context 
the system is embedded within, where the system finds its conditions for self-
preservation and those elements that create and sustain it, and actively selects these 
elements.
213
 The top-down control of the these interactions increase as one goes up 
the organizational ladder, but this complexification is at bottom fuelled by open 
systems being driven far from equilibrium as a result of exchanges of matter and 
energy with their environment. Increased top-down feedback from the system to its 
constituents involves increased decoupling from energetic constraints on this 
interaction, and allows the system more autonomy to select the elements in its 
environment that it is to be affected by, but the downward causation of such complex 
dynamic systems is never severed completely from that which can be included within 
an broad version of physicalism.    
 
 
3.2 top-down causation as context-sensitive constraints 
 
 
The type of causation that comes into play as previously independent elements are 
coupled and integrated into a complex whole is not the effective causation of 
determinate microstructural entities participating in a causal chain, but rather 
conceived of in terms of constraints. Greater complexity is achieved through a greater 
degree of control of the constituent elements participation in the whole, where the 
selective criteria that emerge from the interactions of the system with its context 
exercise a restraining influence on the movements or freedom of its components. The 
emergence of context-sensitive constraints “take the system away from independence 
by making the elements comprising the system interact in such a way that their 
behaviour depends on one another’s- and on what went before and what is occurring 
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around them in the environment.”.214 The causal property of the system to effect the 
interaction of its parts is not the power of some overriding entity to reach into an 
isolated and causally closed system but is a product of the systems feature of openness 
and the context it is embedded within. It is defined by the conditional probabilities 
that that describe the range and behaviour of microstate arrays; “The novel complex 
interaction just is the changed probability distribution of the components’ state 
space”.215 These constraints retain the systems integrity by restraining freedom of its 
microphysical components without eliminating it, and by this maintain the global 
dynamics of the system to an optimal degree (which means more freedom for the 
system as a whole). This causal power is genuinely emergent in that it is not reducible 
to an aggregation of the lower-level constituents causal power, for as Juarrero states; 
“The causal relationships that the new codes specify about the higher level are for the 
most part sealed of from the energetic-type causes operating at the lower level” 216, 
and so the higher-level patterns that come about as a result of the interchanges of the 
system and its environment is not reducible to the mass effect of lower-level 
constituents. 
  
Since this kind of causation is not definable within the parameters of Kim’s 
ontological physicalism, what is to be added in order to describe such higher-level 
downward causation? As mentioned it is the context and historicity of a system that 
affects its organizational, or higher-level patterns, in relation to its material 
constituents. Constraints are constructed both by the open systems’ embeddedness 
within a larger context
217
 and on what has gone before (the systems initial conditions), 
represented by the changed probability-distribution of the microphysical 
components.
218
 These kind of context-dependent constraints are often described in 
terms of ontogenic landscapes, where systems are visualized independently of their 
substance and spatio-temporal scale  and components described in relational terms. 
Here we speak of topological rather than substantive entities. It is important to 
understand that such organizational constraints are independent of specific physical 
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configurations, although they are always realized in the physical space.
219
 The 
requirement that organizational constraints are always realized in physical systems 
means that physicalism as such is not abandoned but it would entail giving up on the 
“completeness of physics”220 principle which informs Kim’s conception of 
supervenience and his demand of decomposability. So physicalism is not here 
exclusively related to the principles expressed by microphysics, but it is still 
concerned only with the goings-on of the physical world.  
 
 
3.3 Ontogenic landscapes and top-down feedback 
 
An ontogenic landscape is a systems phase space, an abstract space whose coordinates 
are the degrees of freedom of a system’s behaviour. A system near equilibrium would 
have a completely flat landscape, representing an object with no propensities or 
dispositions. Such dispositions are expressed as attractors, which are defined as a set 
of points in a phase space in which the trajectory of the system flows towards.
221
 An 
open dynamic system made up of configural regularities affecting constituent 
interactions develops quite a different topography from that of a closed near-
equilibrium system. Juarrero describes how such a phase space appears, in the 
following quote: 
 
In contrast, the increased probability that a real system will occupy a particular state can be represented 
as wells (dips or valleys in the landscape) that embody attractor states and behaviours that the system is 
more likely to occupy. The deeper the valley, the greater the propensity of its being visited... 
Topologically, ridges separating basins of attraction are called separatices or repellers. Sharp peaks are 
called saddle points representing states and behaviours from which the system shies away and in all 
likelihood will not access; the probability of their occurrence is lowered or eliminated altogether... 
Separatrix height represents the unlikelihood that the system will switch to another attractor given its 
history, current dynamics, and the environment. The steeper the separatix’s walls, the greater the 
improbability of the system’s making the transition. On the other hand, the deeper the valley, the 
stronger the attractor’s pull, and so the more entrenched the behaviour described by that attractor and 
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the stronger the perturbations needed to dislodge the system from that propensity. The broader the floor 
of a basin of attraction is, the greater is the variability in states and behaviours that the attractor allows 
under its control. The narrower the valley is, the more specific is the attractor, that is, the fewer state 
and behaviours within its basin.
222
 
 
 This paints quite a different picture of than the mechanic instance-causation of Kim, 
where any higher-level causation is made out to be mereological aggregates of linear 
relations among its intrinsic constituents. The details of the systems material 
components come second to its dynamics of process, and the causality affecting these 
dynamics is a negative or constraintive power. Unlike the lower-level energetic type 
causes determined by the laws of physics, such system-level forces are understood as 
restraints reducing the possibilities of the pathways that the system may follow. There 
are no forces from above operating here, no “vital entelechies”, just feedback from the 
features of the whole system to the architecture of its components. This type of 
causation is circular, in that it involves an interdependence of the components 
processes and the organizational unity that they comprise, but avoids the problems 
marring downward causation viewed within Kimean supervenience-perspective. 
Complex adaptive systems are characterized by recursive feedback-processes in 
which the product of the process is necessary for the process itself, precisely the kind 
of circular causality that Kim considers incoherent. On Juarrero’s account this kind of 
causality is rather a genuine organizational force, operating not as the efficient causes 
treated by classical physics but in terms of meaningful criteria determined at the 
higher level.
223
  The microphysical configuration of the network exercises its causal 
efficacy and produces a particular output in virtue of being entrained into a higher-
level dynamics that thereby embody emergent semantic features,
224
 where the 
semantic content of such features is integrally related to its contextual embeddedness 
and external interactions;  “for the ideas of feedback, information, environment, past 
experience are normative categories; we cannot make sense of them in any purely 
physical system, but only in a system that admits values, evaluations and norms”225. 
We see here the introduction of semantic and normative aspects of higher-order 
constraints, describing the parameters of the global, higher-level criteria for such 
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constraints. Even in simple recurrent networks such as artificial word-reading systems 
the context-dependence of grammatical constraints operates as feedback-loops 
constraining the output of the system by way of semantic or informational criteria. 
When such a word-reading system is trained to learn the frequency of occurrence of 
each possible successor word for each possible context, it reveals the development of 
an internal dynamic that reflects grammatical category and meaning.
226
 The output of 
the network is in other words constrained by emergent semantic features, these setting 
criteria of suitability that determined the output. Even in such a simple system the 
output is not determined by intrinsic variable configurations but the information such 
configurations carry when integrated into a context-sensitive system.  
 
The informational characteristics that determine the constraintive direction of the 
higher-order organizatory power differs on account of the degree of internalization of 
such top-down constraints. In weakly emergent systems such boundary-constraints are 
imposed exogenously, as in the above-mentioned word-reading network, whereas 
genuinely emergent systems such as the living organism determines the criteria of 
suitability guiding top-down selection endogenously. The regulatory processes that 
constrain the direction of its components are here produced by the systems own 
dynamics rather than its values being set by external influences. They exhibit a degree 
of autonomy not seen in the weakly emergent systems, this being based on their 
ability to “create the very constraints that control the matter-energy flows that make 
the structure possible”.227 On Juarrero’s account the key notions are here are fitness 
and normativity;  
 
Instead of processes being determined by energetic considerations alone, selection based on criteria of 
suitability determined at the higher level defines a direction that is increasingly autonomous and 
decoupled from merely energetic considerations.(…). The dynamics themselves also select and delete 
components according to fitness criteria determined at (and meaningful for) the level of the coherent 
whole.
228
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 In this “formal cause-like process”229 of top-down selection a normative process is at 
work. The notion of normativity or fitness is intimately connected with that of 
movement or activity. In self-organizing systems movement is always directed by the 
goal of “maintaining stable patterns despite constant change in the matter in which 
they are composed and despite perturbations”,230 and so any change is steered by the 
normative criteria of self-preservation or maintenance, in relation to the context the 
system is embedded within. The fitness-criteria is the persistence of the whole,
231
 and 
so the restraining of lower-order components and boundary conditions is done on the 
basis of such normative criteria.  
 
 This internalization of regulatory processes is a gradual evolvement, starting with the 
emergence of chemistry, where the selecting of component molecules in such a way 
that the far-from-equilibrium conditions necessary for its dynamical persistence is 
maintained is the minimal sense of such normative function. The internalization of the 
criteria of suitability that top-down selection of lower-level components is carried out 
according to gives the system more freedom in determining the contextual 
interactions it can enter into.
232
 Systems where the constraints that control the matter-
energy flow that make the structure possible have been fully imported into the system 
are termed autopoietic. The criteria of top-down control and the related robustness in 
maintaining its organizational identity in the face of external perturbations must here 
be understood in relation to how the system is structurally coupled with the context it 
is embedded within. Intentionality and normativity is here defined in terms of the 
‘goal-directed’ process of self-maintenance of organizational or operational closeness 
within a domain of interaction specified by these very fitness-criteria. Thus emerges 
“the strong autonomy present in biological hereditary autonomous systems”.233 The 
mechanism of this relation is the subject of the next section. 
 
We seem to have here a prime candidate for the kind of casual power that we demand 
of that which is to be considered in connection to agency and mental causation, but it 
is still a long way of that of the cognitive powers of the human mind. Juarrero’s 
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account does however suggest the fundamental prerequisites of such cognitive 
capacitates and we can imagine the continued decoupling of complex systems from 
energetic forces, and the adjacent emergence of informational or normative 
mechanisms could end up with rational biological creatures such as us. Before I 
explore the ideas of dynamic openness and organizational closeness in relation to 
cognitive capacities of sentient beings I would like to present the origins of the idea of 
organisms as autopoietic structures of process, and introduce the idea of cognition as 
the relationary process of such systems to its context. 
 
 
3.4 Autopoiesis- the organization of the living 
 
 
The term autopoiesis was introduced by the Chilean neurobiologists Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela in a paper written in 1974. They were concerned with 
disclosing the nature of the living organism, by way of revealing “the organization of 
living systems in relation to their unitary character”,234 and looking at how cognition 
is a biological phenomena constituting the realization of such a unity in the physical 
space. Rather than considering the physical structure of biological systems and the 
properties of these components they looked to how the spatial relations between 
structural components are specified by the network of processes of production of 
these components.
235
 The term autopoiesis was coined in this connection in order to 
capture the central features of the living, namely autonomy and self-production,
236
 the 
two characteristics of its organization. Their goal of divorcing the term organization 
from any mystical or transcendental connotations and instead using it to refer to the 
specific relations that pertain to an autopoietic system is reflected in Juarrero’s effort 
to deny the evolvement of forces over and above the “processes interlaced in the 
specific form of a network of productions of components which realizing the network 
that produced them constitute it as a unity.”237 The claim that it is the organization of 
living systems, rather than the physical constituents realizing this network that “holds 
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it together” (as in gives it its identity) is in Maturana and Varela's work explained 
through the use of the term machine. By this they remove themselves from any 
vitalistic implications. They start of by comparing living systems to artificial 
machines. In any machine the organization is independent of its structure, that being 
the components which integrate a concrete machine in a given space. The 
organization does not first and foremost specify the properties of these components, 
but rather the relations which these must generate to constitute the machine as 
unity.
238
 Unlike an artificial or man-made machine however, living systems have as 
an essential characteristic that the product of their organizational function is not 
something different from themselves. Their goal is self- maintenance, not the 
production of some external result. The goal-states of artificial, or allopoietic 
machines are defined by something external to it and so it has no autonomy because 
its organization is subservient to conditions determined externally, whereas the living 
system set the variables in accordance with its own demands for self-production. 
 
According to Maturana and Varela, the living system maintains its organizational 
integrity by a continuous production of components that are involved in the 
transactions and transformations which constitute the system.
239
 The idea that the 
identity of the system is preserved on the organizational level rather than the level of 
physical structure mirrors Juarrero’s explication of how it is the downward forces of 
this integrity that holds the system together. Maturana terms such stability-
maintaining systems homeostatic machines, defined as a device for holding a critical 
systemic variable within physiological limits,
240
 the critical variable here being the 
systems own organization: 
  
An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of 
production (transformation and destruction) of components that produce the components which: (i) 
through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of 
processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the 
space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as 
such a network”.241 
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Just as in Juarrero’s account the dynamic or active nature of this network of processes 
of production is emphasised rather than the focus being on the instantiations of 
properties in entities tied to determinate spatio-temporal positions, as was the basis of 
Kim’s supervenience-view of higher-order causality; 
 
 (…) autopoietic machines are unities whose organization is defined by a particular network of 
processes (relations) of production of components, the autopoietic network, not by the components 
themselves or their static relations. Since the relations of production of components are given only as 
processes, if the processes stop, the relations of production vanish; as a result, for a machine to be 
autopoietic, its defining relations of production must be continuously regenerated by the components 
which they produce.
242
 
 
Although we can divide physical autopoietic machines into parts this does not mean 
that we can explain the operations of it on account of these parts as it “does not reveal 
the nature of the domain of interactions that they define as concrete entities operating 
in the physical universe”.243 In Kim’s account of higher-order systems on the other 
hand, the demand of reductive identity with their microstructural realizers means that 
they are sufficiently described by the parts and their interactions. Here the hierarchy is 
turned on its head as material particulars are considered as parts through their role as 
components realizing the systems organizational unity.
244
 The consistency of the 
autopoietic machine that Maturana and Varela stipulate is not on determined by its 
maintaining its components constant (being static), but by maintaining constant 
certain relations between components otherwise in continuous flow or change, that is, 
maintaining constant the relations that define them as autopoietic.
245
  Living systems 
differentiate themselves from the non-living by being autonomous, in the sense that 
the product of their functioning is the maintenance of their organization, unlike 
allopoietic machines that have as the product of their functioning something different 
from themselves. This means that the conditions of such maintenance are not 
determined exogenously, but by the organizational nature itself. The capacity of 
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autopoietic machines to specify their own boundaries by way of their operations of 
self-productions makes them unities in a way that allopoietic machines are not. Their 
boundaries are specified by the observer, who in specifying its output and input 
surfaces specifies what pertains to it in its operations.  
 
The elements of autonomy and self-determining identity must be understood in 
relation to Maturana and Varela’s use of the concept of cognition, which they 
consider to be the defining characteristic of the implementation of an autopoietic 
system as a physical system; “autopoiesis in the physical space as a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a system to be a living one”246 Maturana says, implying that 
the process of autopoietic self-production must always take place in a physically 
instantiated system. So even though organization is logically prior to structure in the 
autopoietic understanding of the living, such a system must always be realized as a 
physical structure in order to be characterized as living. The notion of physical space 
in the above quote does not however refer exclusively to the internal structural 
composition of the system, but just as much to the physical space which it must 
interact with in order to preserve its organizational unity or identity.
247
 The 
organizational closeness that provides the autopoietic system with its integrity is 
interdependent with a material openness that subserves the maintenance of 
homeostasis. Cognition is the relation that binds the two together. 
 
Maturana says that; “living systems are cognitive systems and living as a process is a 
process of cognition.”248 An autopoietic system as a homeostatic system has as its 
function to produce and maintain its circular organization by determining that the 
components which specify it should be those whose synthesis or maintenance it 
secures
249
 and it defines its domain of interactions according to the maintenance of 
this circularity. The domain of interactions that a living system can enter into is called 
its cognitive domain and is on Maturana and Varela's account different from its 
environment, which lies exclusively in the domain of the observer and is defined by 
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the classes of interactions into which the observer can enter into and which he treats 
as a context for his interactions with the observed organism.
250
  
 
 By considering cognition to be intrinsic to any living system the theory of autopoiesis 
takes some of the mystery out of the mental. Cognition is here related to a domain of 
interactions specified by the demands of the living systems organization. It’s a far cry 
from the idea of cognition as the disembodied manipulations of internal 
representations as is suggested by the view of the mind as ‘inner’.  The process of 
cognition is in the autopoietic perspective a fundamental biological function that is 
necessarily subordinated to the maintenance of homeostatic equilibrium
251
. Because 
the power to interact with its context is an essential element of the autopoietic system 
as an open system it is present at all levels of that which can be characterized as 
living. On this account there is no sudden appearance of cognitive power as one 
moves up the scale of biological complexity. The notion of cognition as utilized here 
is however without the characteristics which I earlier presented as defining of the 
mental. Here the concepts of normativity or purpose belong to the domain of domain 
of descriptions, reflecting the operations of an observer considering the system in 
some encompassing context. Unlike Juarrero, Maturana believes that the notion of 
function in the telenomic sense has no explanatory value concerning the operations of 
the autopoietic organization. “Living systems” Maturana states, “as physical 
autopoietic machines, are purposeless systems”.252 According to him, the relations 
implied in the notion of function are not constitutive of the organization of autopoietic 
systems but are descriptive notions used to characterize a system in relation to some 
context of use defined by an observer.
253
 What then happens to the idea Juarrero 
expresses, that elements present in the systems cognitive domain are imported into its 
structure through a selection process where the fitness criteria is the persistence of the 
system (as a normative process)? What about the systems apparently goal-directed 
activity of pursuing selective exchanges within its domain of interactions in the 
process of maintaining its organizational integrity? It would seem as if this normative 
selective property is an integral part of the autonomy of any living system, as it must 
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be if we are to make sense of mental causation as intentional or semantically guided 
causation.  
 
The original theory of autopoiesis was meant to apply first and foremost to existents 
on the cellular or molecular level and so it can be argued that there is here no need for 
graded norms and goals. It provides us with the all-or nothing norm of self-
continuance, but not the graded norm implied by an organism actively seeking to 
improve its conditions of self-production.
254
 It does seem hard not to recognize an 
aspect of adaptivity or function in the self-maintaining activity of living systems at 
levels above the bottom, a richer sense of agency than that implied by the a minimal 
purpose of continued self-maintenance. As I will relate further on, Valera later came 
to believe that normative notions are constitutive properties the whole system 
possesses because of the way the system is organized, and so that it is not simply 
descriptive but also explanatory.
255
 This requires more than the “conservation of 
identity through internal material turnover and external perturbations to the 
system”.256 In addition a minimal agency, in the sense of the capacity of the organism 
to actively improve its conditions of self-production must be present, a capacity that 
all biological beings share. 
 
 
3.5 Self-organization and top down causation in biology 
 
Those that consider cognition or the mental in a naturalistic perspective want the 
understanding of this term to refer to the biological domain, in the sense that it is in 
this area that many of the explanatory resources for making cognition intelligible is 
taken from. In the words of the cognitive scientist Randall D. Beer; “if it deals with a 
living system it must be about biology.”257 This entails reduction to a certain degree 
but not causal reductionism as implied in Kim’s account. Its ontological reductionism 
as adherence to the idea that there are no “non-physical” forces at play, but also that 
there are levels or orders above that covered by physics that have genuine causal force 
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of a downward kind, and that should be subject to scientific research in its own right. 
Within biological science there has been an increasing recognition that it is not 
sufficient to understand biological entities in terms of their physical or chemical 
composition but that it must be supplemented by the recognition that living beings, 
whether they be bacteria or rational human beings, share the characteristic of dynamic 
openness. The move from focusing solely on the physiochemical requirements for 
life, as dictated by the analytical methods of molecular biology,
258
 to recognizing the 
characteristics of the living entity as a system emerging on higher levels of 
organization reflects the paradigm-shift which was taken up in the section on Juarrero.  
It involves an increased recognition that the previously taken or granted initial and 
boundary-conditions of living systems must be treated as subjects of study in addition 
to the material conditions that occur within these, as well as a shift from considering 
complex wholes as aggregates of their parts towards putting emphasis on relational 
processes over material components.
259
 It is a move away from the constraints of the 
atomist scheme of strict physicalism, and a move towards the claim of non-
reductionistic physicalists that the study of biological processes at the level of 
underlying physicochemical components should be complemented by the recognition 
that not all processes making up complex systems such as living organisms can be 
adequately described in physiochemical terms.
260
 The reduction of biological 
processes to their underlying physical and chemical components involves a denial of 
the existence of cognition as the characteristic of emergent higher levels of 
organisation
261
 because this notion can not be formulated in physiochemical terms. 
The belief among those that consider teleonomy, in the sense of the normative 
character of cognition, to be intrinsic to living organisms is that such a reductionistic 
approach leaves out a central feature of life; 
  
The mechanistic approach has been most successful towards making new discoveries but is insufficient 
to account fully for biological phenomena. The laws of physics alone can not explain biological 
processes above the molecular level of organization. There is no need to introduce “vital forces” or any 
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other metaphysical entities, but principles of explanation not reducible to those of physics and 
chemistry are required.
262
  
 
It is particularly evolutionary biology which has taken up these considerations. 
Fundamented by the Darwinian recognition of the importance of context through the 
role of the environment, this branch of biology seeks to divorce itself from the 
restrictions of strict physicalism. By understanding the causal histories of biological 
structures in terms of the goals of survival and reproduction, evolutionary biology 
decouples the macro-properties of the living system from their underlying atomic or 
molecular constituents. Whereas molecular biology claims that the existence and 
structure of a given part of the organism could only be understood in terms of the 
micro-processes by which it is constructed in the individual organism, bringing 
function and goal-directedness into the picture allowed for understanding causal 
processes on higher levels. The restraintive forces of natural selection give direction 
to the evolutionary processes by increasing the adaptivness of the living organism to 
its environment.
263
 The term restraint brings us back to Juarrero’s elucidation of how 
higher-order causal powers constrain the freedom of their own components through 
the limitation of options, thereby giving more freedom to the system as a whole. 
Biology brings the ideas of genuine higher-order causal powers with reflexive 
downward efficacy to bear on real-life phenomenon, thereby presenting a challenge to 
the idea that only micro-particulars dealt with by physics have genuine causal 
standing. The evolutionary biologist Henryk Skolimowksi expresses the challenge to 
the reign of physics as universal paradigm as this;  
 
(…) the particular difficulties in which we now find ourselves in the realm of biology, and also in 
relation to the whole heritage of our scientific knowledge, stem from the restrictive harness of a 
rationality which is no longer adequate for the recent extensions of our knowledge and for the cognitive 
needs of contemporary man. The rationality developed under the auspices of physical science is a 
harness, for it ties us down to a certain conceptual framework and obliges us to observe criteria of 
validity as accepted by the current scientific rationality, and yet often explain phenomena with more 
illumination than would have been possible within any physicalist model.
264
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He presents a number of attitudes characteristic of the ‘old’ physicalist paradigm, 
which reflects those that were presented in the section on reduction, and counters 
these with an equal number of tenets that express the paradigm within which the 
studies of the living is increasingly being conducted within. Many of these reflect the 
principles expressed in Juarrero’s account of higher-order causal power, such as; “the 
methods of physical science are insufficient for the study of the phenomena of life on 
the high level of complexity”, “that we cannot limit ourselves to simple and relatively 
isolated systems, for life systems are enormously complex and intricately connected”, 
and “that the behaviour and action of many large and complex systems is often 
inexplicable by the behaviour of the constituents of the system; the total behaviour 
often equals more than the sum of its parts or differs from this sum.”265. 
  
An illustrative example of research conducted within this non-reductive perspective is 
Donald Campbell’s presentation of the anatomy of the jaws of worker termites.266  It 
also serves as an excellent demonstration of Juarrero’s whole-part constraint applied 
to a real-life dynamic system. Campbell was one of the first to use the term downward 
causation in a scientific context to denote the influence of global, collective-variable 
dynamics on local behaviour.
267
  His account lays out empirically how a larger system 
of causal factors can exert causal efficacy on lower-level entities by means of 
selection. The larger system is the organism in interaction with its environment, where 
feedback from the environment exercises a selective effect on the bottom-up 
production of genetic variation.
268
 Here the potential causal powers of the constituents 
making up the organization in the physical space are activated by the patterns of 
organization of these very same constituents. In other words, there is recursive 
causality at work in a real-life system.  
 
 The selective mechanisms at work in his example are the optimising forces that cause 
the jaws of worker termites or ants to be developed so that they gain the maximum 
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usefulness in the organism (as well as for the greater system, that of the social 
organism). The anatomy of the jaws of worker termite functions in accordance with 
Archimedes’ laws of levers, optimising the form for the survival of the organism,269 
while the formation of the particular proteins of the muscle and shell of which the 
system is constructed is determined by molecular and atomic coupling processes.
270
 
The higher-order law of levers, operating as part of the complex selective systems at 
the level of the organism, is needed to explain the particular distribution of proteins 
found in the jaw and hence the DNA-templates guiding their production. All the while 
the implementation of such higher-level laws is wholly dependent of the bottom-up 
production of genetic variation and in this case the protein structures it produces. So 
in order to understand why such features are developed it is not sufficient to consider 
the micro-constituents that make up the building blocks of such structures, but also 
the function it serves in the larger system.
271
 The downward causation occurs through 
the restraints imposed by the selective system of the highest level of selection that 
affect distributions on all lower levels.
272
 In this case it is a selective system operating 
to sustain a specific level of organisation that constrains the protein distribution in 
social-insect jaws
273
. We can see here a normative process at work, in the sense that 
“(…) components are chosen on account of their fitness regarding organizational 
unity”.274 
 
Campbell considers himself an ontological reductionist, stating that the higher-order 
organizing characteristics of systems can be explained by natural processes,
275
 while 
rejecting the belief that such higher-order causal powers can be explained on account 
of the laws governing its physicochemical rudiments.
276
 This entails that he accepts 
that all higher levels act in conformity to the laws of lower levels and the teleonomic 
achievements at higher levels require for their implementation specific lower level 
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mechanisms and processes which must be specified before explanations are complete. 
However, an additional principle applies to biological systems in which the 
constraintive force of selection is involved. This is the emergentist principle, which 
states that biological evolution encounters laws operating as selective systems which 
are not described by physics and inorganic chemistry and that show downward causal 
efficacy;  
 
Where natural selection operates through life and death at a higher level of organisation, the laws of the 
higher-level selective system determine in part the distribution of lower-level events and substances. 
Description of an intermediate-level phenomenon is not completed by describing its possibility and 
implementation in lower-level terms. Its presence, prevalence or distribution (all needed for a complete 
explanation of biological phenomena) will often require reference to laws at a higher level of 
organisation as well.
277
  
 
In other words, scientific description is still incomplete when all the details of the 
micro-mechanisms involved have been figured out
278
 because when we understand 
the function of these organisms in terms of complexity and hierarchy we must go 
beyond their physicochemical rudiments.
279
 According to the evolutionary biologist, 
the teleonomic character of living beings, that is the adaptive nature of organisms and 
their features,
280
 resides fundamentally in the goals of survival and reproduction
281
 
and so when we speak of goals it is for the most part not the conscious, self-reflective 
value-setting of human beings we are concerned with. Rather it is the normative or 
semantic content of the cognitive relation that obtains between the organism and its 
domain of interaction. The science of biology gives empirical content to the ideas of 
Juarrero and Maturana by utilizing them as explanatory tools in understanding the 
mechanisms of life. Introducing normative concepts allows biologists to describe 
without mystification living entities guided by specific values and directed to specific 
goals
282
 and so provides the fundamentals for understanding how semantic or 
normative factors can play a causal role in directing behaviour in organisms at 
different levels of complexity. The intentional or cognitive capacities characteristic of 
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sentient beings is fundamentally structured around the goals of self-maintenance and 
reproduction, where selection plays the constraining role of optimizing the functions 
of organisms through determining the distribution of lower-level events and 
substances.
283
 The notion of selection will not be treated further here, but as I proceed 
to bring the capacities of cognition and intentionality towards the human realm in the 
next section, it is implicit as the underlying mechanism fuelling these evolutionary 
developments. 
 
 
 
SECTION FOUR 
 
 
4.1 Mind in life- making the mental matter 
 
 
The previous sections have explicated the fundamental requirement of openness and 
the autonomy or capacity for downward control that emerges from it, as well as 
cognition in its minimal sense as that defining the relation between the living entity 
and its context of operations. In this section the goal will be to synthesise these two 
notions so as to gain an understanding of how cognitive capacities can have legitimate 
causal power. In order to achieve this I will present Evan Thompson’s idea of how 
mentality emerges in self-organizing dynamic systems by way of the circular 
causality of continuous sensori-motor interactions involving brain, body and 
environment.
284
 His claim is that the mental can not be understood simply as brain-
processes inside the head but must be fundamented on the cognitive notions implicit 
in the autopoietic organization of biological life and how this finds sentient expression 
in the self-organizing dynamics of perception and action;
285
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Life and mind share a set of basic organizational properties, and the organizational properties 
distinctive of mind are an enriched version of those fundamental to life. Mind is life-like and life is 
mind-like.
286
  
 
The theory to which Thompson subscribes is called embodied dynamicism
287
 and 
arose in the 1990s as a reaction to earlier approaches to cognitive science. Previous 
models of the operations of mind had portrayed cognition as disembodied and 
abstract, focusing on computational representation in the mind-brain.
288
 The earliest 
of these modelled cognition as a computer, cognitive or mental processes being 
viewed as the manipulation of symbolic representations in the brain. According to this 
approach sensory inputs are mapped onto symbolic representations and these 
representations are then manipulated in a purely formal or syntactic fashion in order 
to arrive at a output or solution to a relevant problem.
289
 Although it was an 
improvement from its predecessor, behaviourism, in that it at least recognized brain-
states as elements of interest, this perspective of cognition as serial information 
processing by way of the discrete causal effectiveness of local unit activity in linear 
processes of rule-governed transformation of static structure into another
290
 turned out 
not to reflect the observations of the brain in operation. In addition to lacking 
empirical support it created as well an explanatory gap between sub-personal, 
computational cognition and conscious or subjective mental states that demanded 
explanation.
291
 
 
Unsatisfied with the approach of explaining neural operations by way of the physical-
symbol model, cognitive science turned to connectionism in the early 1980s and it has 
since remained the dominant approach to the exploration of mental processes.
292
  The 
focus is here on the architecture of neural networks, characterized in terms of units, 
layers and connections, and the learning rules and distributed sub-symbolic 
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representations that emerge for the networks that are activated.
293
 The networks are 
mainly modelled as feed-forward, flowing from an input layer to an output layer, 
where information processing occurs by activity expanding through distributed 
networks of neurons.
294
 An illustrative example of the perspective of cognitive 
science is taken from a psychology text-book, where cognition is expressed as mental 
computation;  
 
A central idea behind cognitive science is that he human cognitive system can be understood as though 
it were a giant computer engaged in complex calculation. Just as a computer’s complex calculation can 
be broken down into a set of simpler computations, such as storing, retrieving, and comparing symbols 
or representations, so a person’s action can be broken down into a set of elementary mental 
components.
295
.  
 
This perspective on cognition is reflected in Kim’s view that the mind is reducible to 
“patterns of electrical activity in some group of neurons”296 where mental properties 
are specified in terms of their roles as causal intermediaries between sensory inputs 
and behavioural outputs.
297
 A greater recognition of the interconnectivity of neuron-
populations filling the roles of the mental components is offered by connectionism 
than the previous model of information-processing.  From the perspective of 
embodied dynamicism however, the connectionist model does not fully capture the 
complexity of the connectivity of components making up the neural architecture. As 
well, by appealing to information-bearing states inside the system as internal 
structures that encode context-independent information about the world, cognition 
being the processing of such information,
298
 many issues concerning intentionality, 
language and mind-world relations remain. The main point of contention between 
connectionist models of mind and dynamic approaches is that, according to the latter, 
the objectivist notion of information is an inaccurate way of understanding how these 
representations of the world come about. Rather Thompson takes information to be 
essentially relational, saying that “information is the intentional relation of the system 
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to its milieu”.299 Here information or the semantic aspect of things are not given to a 
disembodied cognizer and mapped onto representational networks as assumed by 
computational models of mind. As a reaction to these representationalist models of 
mind the embodied dynamical model posit mind as an essentially embedded system in 
the world, extended through the body and looping through the material, social and 
cultural environment, rather than as the implementation of input-output directed 
information-processing capacities in the brain. The intentional relations by which the 
living system interacts with its milieu is established on the basis of the systems 
autonomy (its organizational closure), and it maintains this organizational identity by 
acting in accordance with how the elements of its cognitive domain are semantically 
defined by the demands of this autonomy.
300
 In other words, a cognizing being “(…) 
does not process information in a context-independent sense. Rather, it brings forth or 
enacts meaning in structural coupling with its environment”.301 The operations of the 
mind are here not pictured as that of mapping in input at one time onto an output at a 
later time, but always to maintain appropriate change. 
 
This approach claims to dissolve some of the tension between the properties exhibited 
by the mind and those exhibited by the material body, a tension that is expressed in 
Kim’s formulation of supervenience as well as in the contention that the properties of 
mind and those of the body seem to be so different that it is difficult to see how they 
their natures could be described using the same explanatory resources. While the 
semantic property instantiated by an organism’s intentional state is essentially a 
relational fact that involves its relationship to external environmental and historical 
factors, the causal factors conceived as producing behaviour must on Kim’s view be 
intrinsic to the organism. Only the syntactic properties of properties of mental states 
can be allowed causal power if the requirements of supervenience are to be 
followed.
302
 Herein lays the crux of the problem of mental causation.
303
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Considering the operations of mind as essentially interdependent with the activity of 
the living body means that there is no great mystery of mental causation, the capacity 
for such downward affective forces being present as a necessary factor from the very 
beginnings of life. Intentionality, meaning-creation and normativity are parts of the 
activity of the living being because they as autopoietic systems necessarily must stand 
in such relations to the domain where their activity takes place. This general idea is 
expressed in the central tenets of this position, namely that living beings are actively 
self-generating or maintaining in an autopoietic sense and that this self-maintenance is 
conducted through the exercise of cognition by way of embodied action. In higher-
order organisms such as humans this is done through the nervous system, where re-
entrant networks of interacting neurons generates coherent and meaningful patterns of 
activity, in concert with the recurrent sensori-motor patterns of perception and action. 
This coupling between organism and environment modulate the formation of dynamic 
patterns of neural activity, which in turn affects the sensory-motor coupling.
304
  
 
Thompson utilizes the idea expressed by Maturana and Varela that the living system 
defines a domain of interaction through its organization, to which it relates according 
to the demands of sustaining viability, the actual acting in this domain being the 
process of cognition.
305
 However cognition in Thompson’s account is furnished with 
more content because he considers this dynamic interaction to involve the creation of 
meaning. Something becomes informational or gains semantic content through this 
activity of interaction (structural coupling in Juarreros terms). In Maturana's account 
there is no ‘graded information’ being relayed in interactions of the system and its 
milieu, only perturbations caused by the structural coupling of the system and its 
environment. The informational content such perturbations have to the system 
depends on the norms of the systems organization, that is whether it is productive or 
destructive to the systems self-maintenance.
306
 Whereas in Maturana cognition only is 
considered in its minimal sense, the interactions the living unit can enter into being 
constrained only by the basic requirement of self-continuance,
307
 Thompson expands 
this fundamental relation and the organizational closure that demands it so that it 
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becomes a tool for understanding cognition all the way up to the rational human 
realm.
308
  
 
4.2 Activity and the emergence of semantic networks 
 
In the section on Juarrero I presented a downward causation construed as the 
constraintive powers of higher-order semantic organizing powers on bottom-up 
energetic and thermodynamic conditions, where the central element was the 
maintaining of identity by way of dynamic openness. The phase-space or ontogenic 
landscape of a dynamic system describes temporally extended patterns of activity 
where the flow of complex temporal structures mutually and simultaneously influence 
each other
309
  providing more recursive coordination than the connectionist model of 
the mind. Rather than information-processing in terms of input-output relations we 
have a normatively guided top-down restrictive force that determine the semantic 
values of components that are to be integrated into this system.
310
 The central point in 
my presentation of Juarrero’s work is that closed systems can not be autonomous in 
the self-determining sense characterizing living systems, but must fundamentally be 
far-from-equilibrium systems that are constantly active in exchanging matter and 
energy with their surroundings. It is only by being in continuous interaction with 
some encompassing context that the higher-order properties come to be activated. 
Consequently, in the theory of autopoiesis any semantic or informational content of 
the living being does not come about by information gained through sensory input 
being processed and resulting in behavioural output, but is created through the 
reciprocal influences of the organizational closness (or identity) and its material 
openness.  
 
Unlike previous theories of cognition and the metaphysics they inform, the systems 
that emerge from the accounts of Juarrero and Maturana are fundamentally 
interconnected with their surroundings and it is this mutual dependence between the 
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systems organizational closure and its performance in its structural coupling with its 
environment that allows it to be considered as an autonomous agent possessing mental 
capacities. Unlike the disembodied information-processing units described by earlier 
models of cognition the higher-order biological systems of dynamic theories are 
actively forming their environment in order to maintain the organizational structure 
that defines it as a system.
311
 Instead of putting mind and body, or subjectivity and 
objectivity against each other Thompson believes that; “We see the co-emergence of 
inside and outside, of selfhood and a correlative world or environment of otherness, 
through the generic mechanism of network closure (autonomy) and its physical 
embodiment.”312 The distinction between the inner, subjective world of experience 
and the outer, objective world becomes void as they are not conceived of as pre-
existing separate spheres, but “mutually specifying domains enacted or brought forth 
by the structural coupling of the system and its environment.”313 314 Instead of the two 
being pitted against each other, the cognizing subject and the natural world become 
interdependent units and the Cartesian picture of the mind as ‘inner’ dissolves. There 
is no strict division between the inner syntactic properties of the brain and the 
externally related intentional or semantic properties of the mind because the two are 
essentially interdependent. 
 
 
4.3 The reflexive downward causality of the cognizing cell 
 
Thompson’s project is to understand how the characteristics of mind and those of 
biological life can be understood in relation to one-another, and in line with his belief 
that there is a deep continuity between the two he begins at the bottom, by considering 
how this interdependence is present in the nature of the living cell.
315 
Although the 
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cognitive powers of the cell are far removed from those of the rational human being, 
the fundamental mechanisms are the same. Insofar as cognition pertains to the 
behaviour of a system in relation to its environment the terms is as applicable here as 
in the human realm, although the meanings or norms it brings forth in this interaction 
have minimal content. The cell embodies a circular causality that is far from 
theoretical and that satisfies the three criteria of autopoietic organization. Thompson 
presents these criteria as a checklist that reflect the criteria Maturana put forth to 
determine whether a system can be counted as living or not.  
 
The first is to determine whether the system in question has a semi-permeable 
boundary that allows for discrimination between the inside and the outside
316
. By way 
of continuous maintaining of its membrane the cell stands out as a unity against a 
chemical background, giving it its identity as an organizational unit. This boundary is 
not sealed, allowing for exchanges of matter and energy with the outside, thereby 
comprising its thermodynamic openness. So a cell meets the first criteria for being 
considered as a living system.
317
 The second is whether the components of the 
boundary are being produced by a network of reactions that takes place within this 
boundary, not just on the boundary.
318
 The whole of the internalized reaction-network 
must participate in this self-maintenance as it is in the metabolic network of the cell 
that the assimilation of select compounds from the environment takes place.
319
 The 
cell constantly regenerates the components both of itself and the boundary by way of 
selectively importing outside elements, selected by their value as viability-sustaining 
components. If this internal process of production is interrupted, the cell will disperse 
and cease to be a self-contained unity.
320
 The third point is to consider whether the 
two previous points are interdependent. If the internal reaction-network is dependent 
on the boundary it produces for its continued activity, then the system can rightly be 
called autopoietic and therefore living. The cells boundary, or more specifically its 
membrane, is determined by metabolic processes within the cell which are made 
possible by those same boundaries and so the two are interdependent. All this must of 
course take place in the physical space, as is the demand of living systems to be 
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defined autopoetically, and we see here the how cognitive interactions subserve the 
maintenance of organizational unity through metabolism.
321
 In Maturana's words;  
 
What makes this system a unity with identity and individuality is that all the relations of production are 
coordinated in a system describable as an homeostatic system that has its own unitary character as the 
variable that it maintains constant through the production of its components.
322
  
 
and further;  
 
This unity is, thus, a topological unity in the space in which the components have existence as entities 
that may interact and have relations. For living systems such a space is the physical space.
323
  
 
Whereas Kim considered such reflexive downward causality to be incoherent, the 
self-maintaining activity of the living cell demonstrates exactly such a circular 
causation. It is by way of this continued self-production through the recognition of the 
fitness and importing of elements in its cognitive domain that the system persists as a 
spatially distinct individual,
324
 and should this process of metabolic assimilation of 
select compounds from its environment stop it will thereby cease to exist as a distinct 
entity. In other worlds, it will die. Even here, the activity of relating to environmental 
perturbations in ways determined by meanings and norms brought forth on the basis 
of its autonomy
325
, that is cognition, is indispensable in understanding its nature. 
Thompson says; 
 
Thus the cell embodies a circular process of self-generation; thanks to its metabolic network, it 
continually replaces components that are being destroyed, including the membrane, and this 
continually regenerates the difference between itself and everything else.
326
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Here we have the minimal case of an entity which satisfies the requirements of 
autopoiesis and that therefore can be characterized as living. On the other hand, we 
have existents that fail to be counted as living because they do not satisfy the three 
criteria presented above. A borderline case is that of the virus. It does not produce its 
own boundary from within and it has no metabolism of its own by which to exchange 
matter and energy with the environment.
327
 In short, it does not live up to the criteria 
of the living as autopoietic systems realized in the physical space.  
 
The cell, being a minimal case of autopoiesis differs from those systems that are 
second-order in being composed of such first order autopoietic systems. The question 
is whether the criteria pertaining to cellular organization can be applied to such 
higher-order systems or if notions of boundary and internal reaction network must be 
interpreted so as to include only organization on this bottom level. In this case any 
system above this level would simply be aggregates of their first-order components, 
making them vulnerable to the arguments Kim presents against considering 
aggregates as in possession of distinct causal powers. Thompson believes that 
interpreting boundary to mean only semi-permeable membrane or skin is too 
narrow,
328
 and in this he is in agreement with the biologists presented in a previous 
section who consider whole insects-societies autopoietic in the sense that they are 
self-organizing in relation to a domain of interaction. Keeping in line with the 
emphasizing of organization over physical structure, he says that; “Rather, the crucial 
matter is that the system produce and regulate its own internal topology and 
functional boundary, not the particular physical structure that realizes this boundary”. 
329
 This means that second-order systems that consist of such first-order minimal 
autopoietic systems can be considered on the basis of the same criteria as these. What 
is missing in first-order autopoietic systems however is agency, which comes about 
through the emergence of sensory motor faculties that provides the organism with 
flexibility and adaptability in its metabolic maintenance. Without such capacities the 
organism cannot interact with its environment in an autonomic sense and intentional 
relations do not obtain.   
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4.4 The intentionality of metabolism 
 
Cognition in a cell-perspective is still a long way of the goal of understanding how the 
mental can exhibit causal powers in the realm of the rational human, but given the 
thesis that life and mind are fundamentally interconnected cognitive capacitates must 
be placed along an evolutionary continuum; 
  
What we humans experience as thinking, planning, deciding, and acting for reasons must have roots in 
similar but simpler forms of mental activity in lower (or less complex) organisms. If we can appreciate 
the expanding role of the mental in shaping behaviour as we move up levels of complexity within 
animal species, then the causal role of the mental in human life begins to appear less mysterious.
330
  
 
Even as we climb the evolutionary ladder, cognition remains intimately tied to 
metabolism. It is the metabolism of the biological entity that fundamentally 
determines the internal norms that its activity or contextual interactions are regulated 
by
331
 and it is by these that the elements contained in the domain of interactions 
become meaningful. The demands of metabolism determine the parameters of 
interaction because the internal metabolic reaction-network dictates the sustainability-
requirements which its interactions must be subservient to.
332
 It is through metabolism 
that the organism fundamentally maintains its identity; “Without incessant metabolic 
exchange with the world there can be no emancipation of dynamic selfhood from 
mere material persistence”.333  
 
Even in the minimal case of biological cells we can see that the demands of sustaining 
viability requires that the cell relates to its environment in a certain way, the 
importing of molecules from the environment determined by the viability-norms set 
by the metabolic demands of the system. In the biological cell the minimal 
requirements set by its metabolic demands gives it a primitive agency. Thompson 
provides the activity of bacterial (prokaryotic) cells as an example of how life as a 
process of cognition involves agency, albeight in a rudimentary sense. Moving about 
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in the presence of a sucrose gradient they will tumble about until they have an 
orientation that will increase their exposure to this nutrient. They will then swim 
forward towards where the concentration of sucrose is at its greatest
334
. These basic 
organisms are capable of adapting their behavioural responses on the evaluation of 
sensory feedback in relation to the internal goal-states set by its metabolic demands
335
 
and modify the processes of exchange with the environment through adaptive 
responses. In the case of bacterium’s ability to sense the concentration of sucrose in 
its immediate environment and move accordingly, the terms sensory response and 
action must be understood in a broad sense and does not indicate any awareness of 
behavioural flexibility. Here it is easier to see what is meant by the statement; 
“information is the intentional relation of the system to its milieu”.336 The meaning of 
the nutrients in the bacteria’s environment does not contain this semantic quality apart 
from their being valued as relevant for the maintenance of the bacteria’s identity or 
viability. The meanings of autonomous systems states are formed within the context 
of the systems dynamics and structural coupling”337   
 
 
Francisco Varela tries to capture this dynamic interdependent pattern of activity 
apparent in the above example in his twin notions of identity and sense-making.
338
 
The first of the two concerns the production and maintenance of a dynamic or 
organizational identity in the face of material change, as captured in the term 
autopoiesis, while the second is intentionality in its minimal and biological form. It is 
the transformation of a physicochemical world into an environment of significance 
and value, in relation to the maintenance of the biological systems viability. While the 
first is logically prior to the second, identity can not be maintained without the 
intentional or sense making activity of cognition. The identity-making that autopoiesis 
entails establishes” logically and operationally the reference-point or perspective for 
sense-making and a domain of interactions”339, so the content of the intentional 
relation of the organism to its environment is subservient to the maintenance of such 
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an identity, or the autopoietic organization. This notion of intentionality provides 
substance to Maturana’s explication of cognition as the acting or behaving in the 
domain interactions defined by its autopoietic organization.
340
 It supplies the 
organism with meaning and norms that are brought forth in the process of this 
interaction with its environment and as this domain of interaction increases, so does 
the richness of its semantical content.  From the basic normative fitness-criteria of 
maintaining homeostasis through metabolic activity in the living cell to the 
immensely complex operations of belief and desire-guided human thought and 
behaviour, the common denominator is the relation of the system to its context, 
fundamented in thermodynamical openness and organizational closeness. In order to 
remain viable the autopoietic system has to make sense of this world, and on Varela’s 
account of intentional sense-making this relation between the system and its domain 
of interactions is normative in a deeper sense than that suggested by his and 
Maturana’s earlier account of the cognitive relations involved in self-maintenance. As 
seen in the example of the sense-making activity of prokaryotic cells, the emergence 
of the capacity of the organism to actively regulate itself with respects to its 
conditions of viability and thereby modify its environment according to the internal 
norms of its activity provides the graded norms that constrain this same activity
341
. 
The metabolic demands of the system fundamentally determines the values of the 
elements in its surroundings, such as the food-significance provided to sucrose as the 
bacteria metabolizes sucrose-molecules,
342
 but as one goes up the scale of 
evolutionary complexity the all-or-nothing norm of basic self-continuance implied in 
the original theory of autopoiesis does no longer capture the cognitive capacities in 
operation. Although intentionality arises fundamentally from the operational closure 
and interactive dynamics of autopoiesis, the emergence of the nervous-system brings 
an added degree of agency for the organism and a corresponding increase in the 
richness of the meaningfulness and normativity of the relation between organism and 
environment. The nervous-system connects distant sensory-motor processes, 
subsuming them in operationally closed sensory-motor networks,
343
 so increasing the 
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capacity for adaptability in terms of behavioural flexibility.
344
 Accordingly; “Living 
goes from being a process of basic cognition to being sense-making, of bringing forth 
significance and value”.345  
 
4.5 The emerging human mind 
 
At the level of organisms with perceptual faculties the top-down constraintive 
capacities have, as the result of a greater degree of structural complexification of the 
brain,
346
 intentional content far beyond that of the sucrose-seeking bacteria. This 
means more complex evaluative systems, greater amounts of information available 
about the environment and increasing behaviour flexibility, resulting in enhanced 
levels of self-direction or in Juarrero’s terms; a greater degree of decoupling from 
lower-level forces. The capacity for environmental analysis and accompanying 
behaviour responses of the perceiving animal is dependent on the complexity of its 
nervous-system. In short, the level of adaptability and flexibility of the 
interrelationships between environmental feedback and behavioural responses is a 
function of evaluative capacities concerning the two. In insects the nervous-system is 
still rudimentary so any adaptability of behaviour is primarily brought about by 
genetic variations, but behaviour is nevertheless modulated on the basis of immediate 
feedback. There is a basic dynamic of action-feedback-evaluation-action loops present 
here but it is still minimal. The evaluation of behaviour has no learning or memory 
dimension and so the responses or behaviour flexibility is limited to evaluation of 
immediate environmental feedback.
347
 With the introduction of memory the action-
loops complexify further, as the animal is able to keep track of its previous behaviour 
and use this information to modulate ongoing behaviour. Here the downward power 
occurs as a successful pattern of behaviour (meaning that there is positive feedback 
from the environment in relation to a particular goal-state of the organism) causes 
particular brain-systems to become active in order to reinforce the specific neural 
pattern involved in the preceding behaviour.
348
  To put it in terms of ontogenic 
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landscapes: as a particular course of action shows itself successful, the meaning or 
content that the network attributes to the external events satisfying the demands of its 
operational closeness takes the shape of or reinforces an attractor. As this strengthens 
through repeated reinforcing the system will tend toward this pathway, making a 
repeat of this behaviour more likely. Attractors are viewed here as activity-patterns of 
the brain,
349
 the flow of which is constrained by the larger network they play a part in. 
 
An even greater degree of behavioural flexibility accompanies the introduction of 
long term memory and the capacity for off-line reasoning. Here the cognitive domain 
and our sense-making capabilities does not concern just that which is accessible to us 
in the immediate physical world because, largely owning to the acquisition of 
language and the capacity for manipulating information off-line, the dynamics of 
sensory-motor activity become reflexive. This can be seen in higher-order animals as 
well as humans. An example is the problem-solving capacities of chimpanzees, who 
demonstrate the ability of representational manipulation in situations demanding such. 
When presented with a banana hanging out of reach and two poles, both too short to 
reach the banana, chimpanzees will first try to reach the food with either of the poles. 
Not being successful in this they will retreat and then, after a period of what appears 
to be the manipulation of mental images of the poles, the bananas and potential 
actions regarding the two, immediately proceed to put the poles together and pick 
down the bananas.
350
 Here the semantic content of intentional acts are only secondary 
related to the immediate physiochemical environment and thus the domain of 
interactions of the system widens to include also that which is present only as a 
potential source of ‘metabolic food’.  
 
The capacity for off-line manipulations of representations and symbols means that we 
can set aside immediate goals for the attainment of more distant, and not immediately 
related to maintainance of metabolic efficacy. Related, normativity is no longer 
directly tied to the maintaining of homeostasis through metabolism but is 
complexified as we interact with social and cultural environments. A great deal of 
human behaviour is unconsciously intentional in that it proceeds automatically, 
meaning that we are not at the time aware of the off-line simulations taking place. 
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Nevertheless, even though human action and accompanying thought is not always 
consciously intentional, our capacity for self-reflective awareness means that even 
acts that are not initially conscious can become the object of reflections or evaluations 
if it is needed. We have here a kind of third-order emergence of mental capacities 
which differ from the goal-directed intentionality of its precursors in that reflection 
can be turned on itself and articulated as reasons.  
 
The capacity for self-reflective awareness and the flexibility of action provided by 
off-line ‘mental imaging’ appears to coincide with the expansion of the prefrontal 
cortex of the brain. That is not to say that human agency and adaptability is to be 
located here, because this area has extensive re-entrant, or two-way, interactions with 
all of the motor, sensory and affective areas of the cortex,
351
 but it does seem to play 
an important role in the integration of perceptual information and modulation of 
behavioural response. The prefrontal cortex’ role in organizing “goal-directed 
behaviour with respect to changing immediate and long-term context”352 is exercised 
through top-down influences of lower-level control systems in the brain, constraining 
the freedom of these, all the while being dependent on the feed-forward of the 
activations of lower-levels which are in direct contact with environmental influences. 
Here is a model of the brain as an extremely rich version of a complex dynamic 
system, the prefrontal cortex being an important role-player in larger whole-brain 
networks that evaluate and modulate action by way of context-sensitive restraints
353
 
The evolvement of the large prefrontal cortex in humans allows for richer interactions 
and increased top-down regulation by higher order supervisory systems capable of 
evaluating lower-order cognitive processes.
354
 
 
I stated previously that the emergence of capacitates for intentional sensory-motor 
interactions with a co-emerging environment should be understood as lying along an 
evolutionary continuum. There is however one major ‘jump’ in this continuity that 
takes place as the capacity for symbolic language emerges, in concert with the 
development of the prefrontal cortex. Here it is the mapping of relationships among 
words, not the relationship between the symbol and the external environment (as it is 
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in simpler forms of mental images) that provides cognitive efficacy.
355
 Understanding 
the causal power of language as that of contextual constraints on the neural activities 
that embody its use means recognizing the organization of the brain as a nested 
hierarchy of top-down controls through “recurrent connections that enable re-entrant 
feedback loops”.356 In brain-terms, feedback from the environment serves to as a 
selective influence on the vast number of neural connections so as to strengthen those 
that are conducive to its performance. The brain becomes a self-modifying system, 
where the top-down constraints of the semantic networks modify its neural structure 
in response to the norms of its operations. “The organizing system is trained by the 
environment, and it in turn has downward casual efficacy in governing lower-level 
cognitive processes and thus the neural structures that subserve them”.357 The 
formation of abstract concepts takes place as the development of broader basins of 
attraction in semantic space, originating out of our sensory-motor experiences. 
Complex meanings and concepts arise out of the basic requirement of autopoietic 
cognition, language being only intelligible within a context of action.
358
  
 
The issue of language is complex and I cannot go further into it here, so I will restrict 
myself to saying that it is with the emergence of language that we reach the pinnacle 
of rational capacities, the ability to form and act according to explicit reasons. We 
seem here to have reached the kind of intentionality that philosophers of mind are 
concerned with. Unfortunately there is no room here for exploring further the specific 
mental capacities making up the human mind, of which consciousness (as the self-
reflective awareness of such capacities) is of special interest, but hopefully what has 
been presented here provides a general outline of how such capacities can be 
understood.  
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4.6 Dynamic action from cells to humans  
 
 
I have attempted to trace intentionality, or more generally the activity of cognition, 
from its minimal form in cells and bacteria to the deliberative off-line reasoning of 
language-using humans, the common denominator being that the organism is 
normatively related to an outside specified by the self-production of an inside.
359
 In 
autopoietic terms; “the dynamics of the system is characterized by an invariant 
topological pattern that is recursively produced by the system and that defines an 
outside to which the system is actively and normatively related.”360  
 
What sets this understanding of cognition apart from the earlier presented 
connectionist models is that the neural processes they are constituted by are embedded 
in larger causal and semantic networks, these being contextualized physical states. 
Meaning is not in the brain and not independent of the embeddeness of the cognizing 
being in environmental, social and cultural contexts.
361
 Being a bearer of information 
(in the sense of having semantic content) has causal power through its role in action-
feedback loops, not through identification with a certain area of neuronal activity, 
although the ability for adaptive responses is instantiated as structural changes in 
these networks. To put it in the words of dynamic system theory; intentional action is 
the continuous top-down control of contextual constraints on the probability 
distribution of behavioural alternatives. In terms of ontogenic landscapes; “feedback 
between external circumstances and internal dynamics can drive neural dynamics far 
enough from equilibrium so that one attractor becomes an intention, reorganizing the 
landscape.”362 The role of the mental is as a structuring influence on the flow of 
events on lower levels. 
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The interdependence of mind and life means that our mental lives cannot be 
understood apart from our bodily activity, the most fundamental of these being the 
basic self-regulation of the living cell. In organisms with a nervous-system the 
domain of activity and thereby the richness of content and intentionality expand as the 
autonomous sensory-motor agent emerges. This kind of sensory-motor coupling with 
the domain of activity in turn lays the fundament for the evolvement of a mental life 
in terms of beliefs and desires, and ultimately reflective self-awareness. It is 
permissible I believe, to claim that the appearance of substantial mental life coincides 
with the appearance of the faculty of perception. It may not be the self-aware 
consciousness of the rational human being, but it is here that the issues of agency and 
cognitive capacities start to become relevant. On the account presented by the 
enactive approach, cognition, as the intentional activity of producing and maintaining 
the self by interaction with an environment, has powers that can not be sub-seeded by 
the intrinsic material composition of the organisms as is Kim’s contention, because 
the parts making up the whole are only definable in relation to the whole it is a part 
of. 
 
I stated in the beginning of this paper that the intentional nature of the mental was, 
along with its related normativity, a great part of what apparently makes it difficult to 
fit into a physical world conceived of as consisting of particles with determinate 
spatio-temporal locality. The consequence of the dynamic approach to mind-body 
relations is that mental life is fundamentally interwoven with our identity-maintaining 
activity of relating to a physiochemical world, and so cognition cannot be understood 
apart from action. Mental influences do not intervening in a linear causal fashion 
between sensory ‘input’ and motor ‘output’ as Kim’s functional approach suggests, 
they are the structuring powers of the organism in action: 
 
In other words, as a skilful activity of the whole animal or person, perceptual experience emerges from 
the continuous and reciprocal (non-linear) interactions of sensory, motor, and cognitive processes, and 
is thereby constituted by motor behaviour, sensory stimulation, and practical knowledge. On the brain 
side, neural states are described not at the level of their intrinsic neurophysiological properties or as 
mere neural correlates of mental states, but rather in terms of how they participate in dynamic sensory-
motor patterns involving the whole active organism.
363
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The agency and related selfhood which theories of mental causation seek to capture is 
already present in the activity of the sensory-motor organism, originating in the first-
order autopoietic organization of the living cell. There this circular organization and 
its accompanying coupling with the environment was regulated by a minimal 
viability-constraint, whereas the richness of semantic content in the sphere of human 
rationality comes about the emergence of second and third-order organizational 
powers which provide us with domains of interactions far beyond that which is set by 
the demands of metabolism. Cognition understood in this sense is accordingly 
essentially tied to our activity as living beings, right down to its beginnings as 
minimal life and can therefore only be understood in terms of the criteria that are 
common to all those existents that can claim sentient existence.  The whole is thereby 
not the sum of its intrinsic parts and their relations, as is Kim’s assumption, but rather 
the organizational closure of its parts that gives all living systems their unity.
364
 
 
 
 
SECTION FIVE: Summary and conclusions 
 
 
If physicalism is to survive as a worldview for us, it must show just where we belong in a physical 
world, and this means that it must give an account of our status as conscious creatures with powers to 
affect our surroundings in virtue of our consciousness and mentality.
365
 
 
I began this paper by expressing the issue to be treated as a question of how there can 
be such a thing as mind in a world consisting ultimately of nothing but bits of matter 
distributed over space-time, behaving in accordance with physical law and by this 
presented the dominant physicalist parameter that the mind-body discussion is framed 
by. Jaegwon Kim’s belief that all higher-order existents must be reducible to the 
entities treated by fundamental physics in order to be allowed within the physical 
domain was shown to be a consequence of this physicalist paradigm. Otherwise, he 
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and his cohort contend, they can not claim any causal standing in a world that consists 
of nothing but matter. Very briefly stated, the argument went like this; each physical 
event, such as that of initiating an action has a complete and sufficient physical cause, 
and if it has a physical cause it can not have a mental cause in addition (so the causal 
exclusion-principle says). Thus mental events must be reduced to physical events or 
they have no causal influence in the world and are therefore not real (on account of 
the equation of existence and causal power as stated in Alexander’s dictum). If, as 
assumed, there is a relation of supervenience between mental and physical events, 
then all the casual work necessarily goes on at the bottom level and any impression of 
vertically directed causality is merely on account of the dependence of the 
supervenient event or property instantiation on its subvenient base. As a consequence 
of this Kim believes that there are only two options available to the physicalist; 
finding a satisfying way of reducing the mental to the physical or denying the 
existence of the mental altogether. Otherwise we are going to have to go for dualism 
and thereby postulate an altogether non-physical domain that somehow mysteriously 
comes to intervene in the goings-on in the physical sphere. 
 
The discussion is often portrayed as being between reductionists of Kim’s sort and 
property-dualists, who posit distinct properties standing in opposition to each other, 
but what I have tried to suggest by presenting theories that consider the defining 
feature of the living to be exercise of genuinely emergent properties of self-
organization, suggesting an either-or version of the causal powers of the mental does 
not do capture the graded complexity of living organisms as physical entities. The 
proponents of a conception of mentality that does not reduce to the physical in the 
way it is construed by Kim, for whom the notion of the physical rests on the 
explanatory completeness of physics, do not in any way wish to postulate entities that 
are non-physical. They still consider themselves physicalists but distance themselves 
from the kind of physicalism that states that all that is worth scientifically 
contemplating are bits of matter and their aggregates behaving in accordance with the 
laws of microphysics. That is not to say that the forces operating at the levels 
described by physics are irrelevant but that they alone cannot sufficiently account for 
all the phenomena that deserve scientifically respectable explanations, there being 
physical forces that are not adequately described by the laws governing their basic 
  82 
parts alone. Rather, macro-properties exhibited by living systems play a causal role 
for which the highly specific micro-based macro-properties of Kim is unsuited.
366
 
Minds cannot simply be reduced to brains because the mind is essentially related to 
the greater system that the brain is embedded in. The non-reductionist treatment of the 
matter as presented in this paper does not rest on considering mainly the metaphysical 
or analytical aspects of the concepts involved but rather on what features are common 
to all that which can be characterized as living, viewed in an empirical light. The 
basic tenet underlying these theories is that there is a continuity of life and mind, the 
idea that organisms even at its lowest forms portend mind and that mind remains 
fundamentally part of the organic even at its highest reaches.
367
 
 
To fully grasp complex systems such as biological existents, and ultimately the 
human organism, we must consider forces characterized by other elements than the 
mere energetic, but that can still be incorporated into a physical universe in a 
satisfactory way. As I have attempted to show in presenting Alicia Juarrero’s account 
of the downward organizational forces that operate in open systems far from 
equilibrium, such higher-order influences on microphysical particulars is a common 
denominator of all systems that are rightly termed complex. There is no mystery 
concerning how these powers operate, their being fully explainable in scientifically 
respectable terms and they do not compete with lower-level laws, but rather 
supplement them. This challenges Kim’s claim that such circular or recurrent 
causality is not possible to conceive of in a coherent manner.  
 
At the basis lies a disagreement over the understanding of the dependence-relation 
obtaining between higher-order properties and the micro-physical particulars that 
realize them. Kim expresses this dependence through the notion of mereological 
supervenience, which has three central characteristics. Firstly, the existents that are 
related to each other here are static elements, instantiations of properties at a certain 
point in time that are always synchronous with those that are co-instantiated. Inspired 
by the dominant views of cognitive science the mental is interpreted as supervening 
on the internal processing of information by neuronal units. The determining relation 
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between these is its synchronous microstructure,
368
 so that capturing the total inner 
state of the brain at a given point in time is sufficient to give a full description of the 
mental. This leads to the second point, that all such supervening events are 
reductively describable in terms of their microstructures. That is, they are 
decomposable into the properties of and relations among their basic particles. Nothing 
more is needed to describe the properties of the whole other than the intrinsic 
properties of their parts, because as mereological supervenience states; “The fact that 
s has P is fixed once the micro-constituents of s and the properties and relations 
characterizing these constituents are fixed.”369 This means that the relation between 
higher-order properties and their realizers necessarily is asymmetric, which is the 
third characteristic of such supervenience. The dependence-relation is one way; the 
parts making up the base-level determine the whole of the supervenient level without 
any such determination of the parts by the whole they make up. These three elements 
are precisely what make it so hard to fit the mental within a physicalist scheme. While 
the properties of the mental states that are allowed causal powers as conceived of 
within the physicalist paradigm underlying mereological supervenience are expected 
to be local and intrinsic, the contents of mental states are essentially relational.
370
 This 
leads to Kim’s question; “How can extrinsic mental properties be causally efficacious 
in behaviour causation?”371 As long as all causality is conceived of as only taking 
place among the micro-structural components of events supervenient on a causally 
closed micro level, then there is no way to fit mentality in without stripping it of its 
essential characteristics. 
  
The non-reductive theories presented in this paper believe that the whole should not 
be equated with the sum of its parts, but rather with the organizational closure of its 
parts. This means going against the assumptions underlying the concept of 
supervenience as it is understood by Kim.  Whereas classical physics, whose 
principles underlie Kim’s approach to reduction were mainly concerned mainly with 
closed systems that are unproblematically describable through the three conditions 
mentioned above, living systems are fundamentally open systems. This means that the 
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content of their material composition is secondary to invariant topological patterns in 
defining their identity. In combination with this organizational unity, openness means 
that such systems can maintain a stable identity despite of constant change in its 
compositional matter. It is precisely the capacity of the system to actively relate to its 
contextual conditions that facilitates the emergence of life and of cognition.
372
 The 
internal composition and relations making up the organism does not alone fully 
capture its nature as living, because in addition the organizational unity plays an 
indispensable part in the structuring of the activity of these material components. 
Accordingly, this organizational unity and the material composition instantiating it are 
interdependent, embodying a circularity that the relation of supervenience does not 
allow. Donald Campbell puts it this way; 
 
supervenience is explicated in terms of entities-particles-properties. This is basically an Aristotelian 
metaphysics, and is an inadequate metaphysics for relationships and process, most specially open 
processes. “Entities” that are organizations of underlying far-from-equilibrium process are not 
supervenient as long as supervenience discounts external relations, and so long as it only counts lower 
level constituents as part of the supervenience-base.
373
 
 
In the dynamic approach presented in this paper, cognition is viewed as extending 
beyond the agents’ brain, the cognizing beings nervous system, body and its 
environment being viewed as coupled dynamical systems. The role of cognition as the 
activity of maintaining organizational unity was expressed through Maturana and 
Varela’s theory of autopoiesis, where the notion of cognition was introduced as 
essentially a relation between an organism as a self-organizing system and the context 
of interactions it operates within. The combination of Juarrero’s openness and 
Maturana’s cognition suggests an alternative picture of the relation between higher-
order processes and their realizers. Descriptions of the internal state of a being at a 
given time and its representational content is replaced with a focus is on the unfolding 
trajectory of the system’s state and the internal and external forces that shape this 
trajectory. Cognition is presented as fundamentally a process of relation and not 
primarily as the state of an organism. This counters the second point of Kim’s 
supervenience-picture, namely that all higher-order properties are decomposable into 
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the properties of its parts. On the picture presented by the dynamic approach two 
apparently identical intrinsic states can have different semantic content, depending on 
how they are entrained into a network of identity-maintaining activity. The causal 
relations at play here are not limited to the horizontal causal chains occurring at the 
level of micro-physical components, because the relative strengths of these 
component processes are continuously affected by how they are retained into a 
organizational whole.  
 
 
5.1 On the intentional nature of the constraintive forces 
 
Understanding the nature of this circularity of self-production is essential to capturing 
the role of the mental. We have here emergent downward causation, a specific kind of 
reflexive global-to-local influence that happens in a system that has dynamic global 
coherence in and through collective self-organization.
374
 It is through this circularity 
that the characteristics of mentality emerge and are explained. On Kim’s account, 
causal processes are only physically respectable if they are reductively identifiable 
with events taking place at the level of their micro-particulars, as seen in the 
identification of functional mental properties with their first-order realizers as micro-
structural properties based at the fundamental physical level. There cannot be any 
physically respectable forces here that are not reducible to the efficient causality of a 
postulated micro-physical level. The accusation against Kim was that this leaves the 
mental with no causal power of its own, to which his answer was that unless the non-
reductionist could point out the mechanisms grounding such forces or powers, his 
approach was the best one there could be. The dynamic systems approach to the 
causal powers of the mental provides such an account, taking configurational forces 
or powers that are empirically demonstrable in physical systems and using them as 
tools to explain how causal forces of an intentional or normative nature are required to 
fully explain the operations of the living being. The active nature of the biological 
entity is emphasised more here than in connectionist approaches to cognition, where 
cognition is viewed as the processing of context-independent information encoded by 
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internal structures. In the dynamic approach information is essentially created in the 
intentional relation of the system to its environment, determined by the systems 
operationally closed dynamics and its modes of structural coupling with the 
environment.  
Summarizing this approach, the belief here is that the process of cognition by which a 
system maintains its self-organization by relation to its contextual conditions is 
structured by recurrent feedback-loops where the semantic information or (intentional 
‘aboutness’) emerges from this essential activity of structural coupling. In living 
organisms with perceptual capacities this constant interaction takes the form of 
action-feedback-evaluation-action loops, where sensory responses guide action and 
action has consequences for subsequent sensory stimulation, subject to the constraint 
that systems maintain its viability. This does not take place as links in causal chains 
leading to physical behaviour, such as is the view of Kim
375
 and of cognitive science 
portraying the mind as starting with sensory input and ending in behavioural output 
but as self-organizing forces modifying the flow of neuronal events.  
The basic autopoietic property of generating own boundary and internal topology is 
there all the way, but is immensely complexified on the way to human beings. The 
downward constraintive power of the higher-order intentional properties of the active 
organism increases as the richness of intentional (or semantic) content increases. This 
process of increasing complexification cumulates in the specifically human capacity 
of acting for reasons and in the power of self-reflective consciousness.   
 
It is important to recognize that the local efficient causes described by physics and the 
global-to-local structuring influences that constrain them are not to competing causes 
here in the way Kim’s supervenience argument assumes. Tracing the mental and 
herein intentionality back to the fundamental defining characteristics of the living unit 
means that reasons do not need to be viewed as in opposition to causes. They are 
causes of a different kind, being constraintive rather than productive and not intrinsic 
to the system. But, as already mentioned, they play an indispensable part in the 
activity of the living organism which can never be captured by considering the 
physical parts of the system alone because; “actions resulting from reasons exhibit a 
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semantic dimension that physical processes lack.”376 It is not only actions resulting 
from explicit reasons that have this semantic dimension, but rather all interaction 
between a living system and its environment. The process of living necessarily 
involves normative selective criteria which in turn involves a cognitive relation 
between the organism and its context of operations.  
 
 
5.2 What about closure and exclusion? 
 
 
If it is the case that the intentional or normative aspects of human nature can be 
satisfactory explained naturalistically and without violating physicalism, what are we 
then to make of the principles that Kim considers to be defining of physicalism? Must 
the ideas of a causally closed universe and of causal exclusion be discarded if such 
semantic causes, as we might term them, are to claim in pass into the physical 
universe? As I elaborated in the section where the principle was presented, the 
demand of causal closure of the physical domain is intimately tied to a certain 
conception of the nature of the physical universe. The ‘bottom level’ making up the 
supervenience base to which all physical phenomena must be reducible is in Kim’s 
view the elementary particles included in the closed physical domain of microphysics.  
He does not however offer any explicit treatment of this principle of closure and the 
charge is, in Thompson’s words, that;  
 
This position claims science for its support, but it is metaphysical in the sense of going beyond 
anything science itself tells us. I see no good reason to believe in such a thing as an “emergence base”, 
where this means a configuration of pre-existing microphysical entities with intrinsic properties and 
causal powers that ground the macro-physical level. This image of nature as a mereologically ordered 
hierarchy grounded on a base level of particulars is a metaphysical principle projected onto science, 
whereas the image science project is of networks of processes at various spatiotemporal scales, with no 
base-level particulars that “upwardly” determine everything else.377  
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In fact, the conservation-principle that underlies his understanding of causal closure 
need not be violated by taking configural or ‘higher-level’ powers into account. As 
stated when this principle was introduced, every physical system is either 
conservative or part of a larger system that is conservative. The domain of interactions 
that an open, far-from-equilibrium system is embedded within is to be understood as 
an encompassing system because, as Juarrero states; “when components are 
dynamically coupled and coordinated, a self-organizing network of components and 
its environment are in fact one system.”378 Accordingly, these interactions can affect 
the distribution of the amount of energy or momentum within the system in question. 
This seems to be in line with Juarrero’s view of context-sensitive constraints as 
configurational forces affecting the probability-distribution of a system’s constituents. 
Considering the energetic and thermodynamic requirments for basic autonomy means 
describing this downward force as the capacity of the system to manage the flow of 
matter and energy in order to maintain itself as a unity.
379
 
 
All changes here are basically explicable in terms of energy or momentum-
redistribution, but in addition to the instances of properties at the fundamental level 
there are forces constraining these constituent interactions in order to maintain a 
stable pattern amongst the constant turnover of material components. In terms of 
neural events, this causal force can be conceived of as modifying the flow of neuronal 
activation so as to make “the fact that a causal tree of neural events converge upon a 
particular bodily movement non-coincidental.”380 381 The continuous affect of context 
and historicity on the relative strengths of component processes is hopefully 
sufficiently described throughout this paper, as well as the point that the micro-
physical particulars not necessarily can claim ontological primacy in this scheme. 
 
Apart from the likelyhood that the conservation of energy principle allows an 
encompassing system to affect the distribution of events of the system it contains, the 
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fact that Kim describes the causally closed domain as a bottom level of fundamental 
particles
382
 is hardly in line with the findings of contemporary physics. Presenting the 
purposed explanatory completeness of physics as the doctrine underlying his 
argument for the reducibility of all higher-order causality to its domain should go 
hand in hand with a presentation of which principles of physics specifically he 
adheres to
383
. As long as these principles are kept wholly implicit the argument for the 
reducibility of higher-order existents remains incomplete.  
 
Regarding the exclusion-principle, there seem to be no special problems of mental 
causation conceived of as downward constraintive forces of a complex system in 
relation to its contextual interactions, because of the fundamental interdependence 
between the different levels of causal existents. The underlying firing of neural 
assemblies does not explain sufficiently why a certain action was initiated in an 
organism with a nervous-system, because in addition the restraining forces of 
semantical context they are embedded within plays an indispensable part in making 
things happen as they do. One could of course question whether such downward 
power deserves the label causality at all, but if we consider causality in the common-
sense way as that of having the power to affect the course of events, then it certainly 
does. In fact, it gives us an extra dimension, and are we to accept the idea that living 
organisms are not first and foremost concrete things but structures of processes, the 
notion of semantic forces constraining the flow of lower-level events is better suited 
to explain how these processes unfold than the view of mental operations as internal 
manipulations or processing of independent information.  
 
Whereas the gist of the supervenience-argument was that considering distinct mental 
events in addition to physical events as sufficient causes of subsequent physical 
events left the mental cause redundant, the non-reductionist theories presented in this 
paper present the two causes as essentially interdependent. Summarizing, there are 
two different kinds of causes at play here, Kim’s energetic or productive causes 
defined in terms of fundamental physical science, and the “negative” restraintive 
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causes of complex adaptive systems characterized by feedback processes from the 
activity of the organism, in which the product of the process is necessary for the 
process itself. While the first is intrinsic to the particulars of the system in question, 
the second is extrinsic in the sense that it is defined as the intentional relation of the 
system to its context of operations (environment), and neither can operate without the 
other. Both are however physically respectable in the sense that they do not resort to 
empirically unverifiable ‘vital entelechies’ and both are indispensable in 
understanding the operations of mind.  
  
 
5.3 Epilogue 
 
 
Kim sets the following requirements for the discarding of a framework; 
 
To motivate the discarding of a framework, we need independent reasons- we should be able to show it 
to be deficient, incomplete, or flawed in some fundamental way, independently of the fact that it 
generates puzzles and problems that we are unable to deal with.
384
  
 
In my view, the dynamic approach offers better solutions to the problems of mind- 
body relations, which apparently arise from the tension between “the objective world 
of physical existence and the subjective world of experience”,385 as Kim puts it. It 
does so by addressing a deficiency in the model of physicalism espoused by Kim, 
namely the belief that the constitution of complex systems and herein the causal 
relations structuring this, can be adequately defined intrinsically, either 
microstructurally or functionally, while the mental characteristics must, in virtue of 
their intentional nature, be defined relationally in an extrinsic sense. Simply stated; 
cognizing beings such as us cannot be understood apart from the contexts of our 
interactions with the world, and that’s where the supervenience-argument goes wrong. 
”You are a living body subject of experience and an intersubjective mental being”,386 
Thompson’s states, and it is this failure to recognize that the mind cannot be isolated 
from its environment that explains the difficulties of reductive physicalists approaches 
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to mental in describing how the mind operates in a physical world in a satisfactory 
way. The issue should not stated as a question of mind-brain relations but must be 
expanded to include the context of operations of the mind and brain, these being both 
body, physiochemical environment and, concerning intentional beings at the highest 
level, social and cultural contexts.    
 
In closing I would like to point out that the approach to mentality and its causal 
powers presented here in response to Kim’s challenge might suggest answers to some 
of the most persistent issues in philosophical discussion. Recognizing how our 
environmental, social and cultural contexts affects the way we think might spur us to 
supplement the conceptual analysis that philosophers are so fond of with a critical 
examination of how these concepts come to be. This requires cooperation between 
empirical science and philosophy and a willingness on the part of philosophers to take 
scientific findings into consideration. The philosophical debate on the mind-body 
issue as in any other should be sufficiently scientifically informed as; “the mental 
does not exist in a theoretical vacuum.”387 Science should as well be respondent to 
philosophically grounded critique of methodology and subject-matter, as awareness of 
the paradigms research is conducted within could provide those concerned with a 
particular problem in a certain domain of science with a wider perspective that can be 
conducive to progress. For example, a shift in methodology from focusing on 
isolating particular systems and studying what takes place within them to recognizing 
the problem of initial conditions and on context-relationalness could provide science 
with explanatory tools for solving problems that persist within the reductionist 
approach. As seen in the domain of biology, such a paradigm-shift is already 
underway. While Kim exemplifies the suspicion that downward causation is viewed 
with in philosophy, science commonly employs it as an explanatory tool. 
 
In cognitive science specifically, abandoning the search for the seat of consciousness 
in favour of the study of the mind/brain as an extended and socially, environmentally 
and culturally embedded system, might prove to be a fruitful way to approach the 
central issues of this scientific domain. Although the reductionist research-strategy 
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has proven useful in many areas; ”reductionism fails when confronted with the mind-
brain problem- thinking changes the operational patterns of neural activities in my 
brain.”388 The notion that intentionality exercises normative restraintive power on the 
lower order causal pathways gives the mental genuine causal efficacy, and it is in this 
downward efficacy on the arrangements of the compositional details of its realizers in 
the brain and that the following should be understood; “the whole is more than the 
sum of its parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical sense, but in the important pragmatic 
sense that, given the properties of the parts and the laws of their interactions, it is not 
a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole.”389 The laws and relations 
governing what is commonly considered the physical domain must be supplemented 
by a description of the contextual relations structuring such physical events into 
complex systems such as ourselves. 
 
In the end, what we have is that which the early emergentists sought- an approach that 
offers a middle way between the extremes of all-out reductionism and inconceivable 
dualism; not saving mind as separate from body, or making body all mind. This 
middle-way might prove the best way forward on the central issues in the discussion 
of how the mind and the physical world fit together.  
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